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Drones have entered American consciousness and society. Little attention, however, has 
been paid to how America got here, how it became a drone nation. This thesis seeks to counter 
the “New Drone” misconception, the general ignorance of drone history present in the 
historiography, and popular perception of the subject. 
Chapter one, “The “New Drone” Misconception: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the 
World Wars,” examines America’s first experiments with military drones. Charles Kettering, 
“Hap” Arnold, and Reginald Denny were among the first to recognize UAV potential and garner 
American support. The main motivation for drone use--removing American soldiers from 
danger--was first recognized during this period. These overlooked early drones suggest that 
contemporary parallels, such as imprecision and civilian casualties, are not new. 
Chapter two, “The ‘Inevitability’ of Drones and the Cold War” questions the inevitability 
of drone adoption. Such perceived inevitability creates a futuristic image, with connotations of 
superiority leading to blanket acceptance. Examining drone development during the Cold War 
reveals a very different reality. Drones faced major obstacles, including technical limitations, 
expense, and competition from other emerging technologies.  
Just as drone technology is not new, neither are the facile policies which guide its use. 
Chapter three, “American Counterinsurgency: The Phoenix Program in Vietnam and 
Contemporary Drone Policy,” is a comparative analysis of American counterinsurgency efforts. 
The integration of drone strikes into counterinsurgency efforts, especially in unofficial war zones 
such as Pakistan, has led to popular interest and concern. Many of the same problems 
vii 
  
(inefficiency, civilian casualties, corruption, and public outrage) that plague drone use also 
haunted America’s efforts with the Phoenix program. 
Because of the potential drones hold today, careful consideration of their problematic 
history is essential. Protecting Americans from war by replacing soldiers with drones has been a 
century long effort. Yet drone use has consistently produced the same warping effect on 
American experiences in war.  Expensive and technologically limited UAVs have been deployed 
inefficiently. The covert nature of many drone programs bred distrust, encouraged immoral use, 
and shielded those responsible from condemnation. Even worse, these efforts accomplished little 












THE BIRTH OF A DRONE NATION 
 In 2001 America first fired a Hellfire missile from a Predator drone. The initial test came 
in February, before the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks which became the impetus for the 
contentious conflicts in which drones have become so common. The Global War on Terror led to 
quick military adoption of armed Predators, and their more capable incarnation, the Reaper. 
These Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), capable of waging war without endangering 
American troops, were used extensively in the official war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan as well 
as covertly in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan.
 1 
Secret operations have often been controversial; 
questions concerning precision, civilian casualties, and international law are frequently raised. 
The wide adoption of this seemingly revolutionary technology has had a major impact on 
America’s military, foreign policy, and image at home and abroad.  
 Drones have lodged themselves into American consciousness and society. Drone strike 
stories make the twenty-four hour news cycle regularly. They either successfully proclaim the 
assassination of a major terrorist leader, or decry the unintended death of civilians. 
 UAVs inundate American popular culture. Filmmakers include them in their movies, 
frequently offering a moral message. The 2013 film Oblivion stars Tom Cruise as a drone 
repairman in a dystopian future. The drones are revealed to be evil, killing the innocent remnants 
                                                          
1
 Terminology is a tricky subject when dealing with drones. Most military personnel and aeronautical 
engineers would use the term drone to reference simplistic target drones which “fly in a persistently dull, 
monotonous, and indifferent manner.” These groups are so stringent in their pursuance of correct terminology that 
they prefer to use an overwhelming number of acronyms (a practice substantiated by an interview with a military 
commander
2
) sure to confuse casual readers. Various terms are Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft (RPA), Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), but the word “drone” is 
unpopular with the military. However, the media, American public, and politicians, have widely adopted “drone.” 
This study will use the term “drone” for general understanding, but also “UAV” since it is considered the correct 
reference to any unmanned aerial vehicle. Paul Fahlstrom and Thomas Gleason, Introduction to UAV Systems, 4th 
ed. Aerospace Series, (Chichester; Wiley, 2012), Accessed February 8, 2013, LSU Libraries, 7; Anonymous Air 





 Zero Dark Thirty, which tells the story of “the greatest manhunt in history,” as the 
CIA pursues Osama Bin Laden, features drones and more drones.
3
 Predator drones were even 
used to spy on Superman. The man of steel crashes a Predator drone in front of a General’s car, 
insisting on his privacy.
4
 Many more examples exist, many in production. 
 Television is not immune to this fascination with drones. One of the primary antagonists 
in the premiere season of Showtime’s Homeland is fictional Al-Qaeda leader Abu Nazir whose 
vengeful pursuits are inflamed after his son is killed in a CIA drone strike.
5
 Homeland won two 
Golden Globes and six Emmys in 2012, including Outstanding Drama Series and Best Television 
Series-Drama.
6
 The second season of HBO’s Newsroom, which retroactively discusses the past 
year’s major stories from the perspective of a cable news team, focused attention on President 
Obama’s drone policy.
7
 The primary antagonist of Fox’s 2014 reincarnation of 24 is fictional Al-
Qaeda operative Margot Al-Harazi. After her husband is killed in a drone strike, she plots to 
assassinate fictional U.S. President James Heller with stolen drones.
8
 
 The recent iterations of the Call of Duty videogames also include drones. As one of the 
most successful franchises of all time, selling nearly 140 million copies worldwide, its cultural 
prevalence is immense.
9
 In competitive multiplayer, gamers are given “Killstreak” rewards after 
killing enough people on the other team. The “UAV Recon” killstreak reward calls in a 
                                                          
2
 Oblivion, dir. Joseph Kosinski, perf. Tom Cruise and Morgan Freeman (New York: Universal Pictures, 
2013), film. 
3
 Zero Dark Thirty, dir. Kathryn Bigelow, perf. Jessica Chastain (Chandigarh, Punjab, India: Columbia 
Pictures, 2012), film. 
4
 Man of Steel, dir. Zack Snyder, perf. Henry Cavill (Lone Pine, California: Warner Bros., 2013), film. 
5
 Howard Gordon and Alex Gansa, writers, "Homeland," Showtime, 2011. 
6
 "Homeland-Awards," IMDb, accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1796960 
/awards?ref_=tt_awd. 
7
 Aaron Sorkin, writer, "The Newsroom," HBO, 2013. 
8
 Robert Cochran and Joel Surnow, writers, "24: Live Another Day," Fox, 2014. 
9




reconnaissance UAV, revealing the location of opposing players. The “Predator Missile” 
killstreak lets users guide a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone. They are among the 
most easily acquired and frequently used killstreaks in the game.
10
 
 Drones are also venturing into daily life. The ACLU has directed its ire at the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulation changes which enable greater drone use by local 
law enforcement. Concerns include privacy protection as well as drones equipped with non-
lethal weapons, including rubber bullets and Tasers.
11
 The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) uses drones for border patrol. Congressional hearings revealed that the Customs and 
Border Protection Agency has repeatedly lent drones to local law enforcement, a practice which 
Secretary Jeh Johnson supported.
12
 Drones were reportedly used during the manhunt for cop-
killing ex-cop Christopher Dorner, though the DHS said this was false. An unarmed Predator 
drone was used in 2011 to find the Brossart family, a group of anti-government separatists.
13
 
 Drone policy, at home and abroad, has inspired satirical critiques. One of the most 
inventive came from fashion designer Adam Harvey who designed a line of anti-drone clothing. 
It features a hoodie, scarf, and burqa made of metalized material which impedes thermal imaging 
cameras.
14
 Online retailer Amazon made headlines, and faced ridicule, when it introduced its 
                                                          
10
 Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (Xbox 360). Developer: Infinity Ward, Publisher: Activision, 2007; Call 
of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (Xbox 360), Developer: Infinity Ward, Publisher: Activision, 2009; Call of 
Duty: Modern Warfare 3, (Xbox 360), Developer: Infinity Ward, Publisher: Activision, 2011. The original Call of 
Duty 4: Modern Warfare has the “Radar” killstreak which deploys a reconnaissance UAV, Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 2 and 3 both have the “UAV Recon” and “Predator Missile” killstreaks. 
11
 "Domestic Drones," American Civil Liberties Union, accessed April 26, 2014, 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/ tag/domestic-drones. 
12
 Stephen Dinan, "Jeh Johnson Wants Homeland Security Drones Focused on Border," Washington Times, 
February 26, 2014, accessed May 3, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/26/jeh-johnson-wants-
homeland-security-drones-focused/. 
13
 "Dorner: A Drone Target on U.S. Soil," Salon, February 11, 2013, accessed May 1, 2014, 
http://www.salon.com/2013/02/11/dorner_a_drone_target_on_u_s_soil/. 
14
 Amanda Kooser, "Anti-drone Hoodie and Burqa Hide You from Surveillance," CNET, April 4, 2013, 
accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.cnet.com/news/anti-drone-hoodie-and-burqa-hide-you-from-surveillance/. 
4 
  
Prime Air delivery service, making use of drones to deliver packages. There was justifiable 
skepticism. The FAA is waiting until 2020 to begin certifying commercial drones. Amazon’s 
announcement also came the Sunday before Cyber Monday, thus gaining attention right before 
the largest online shopping day of the year.
15
  
 Average citizens also use drones. A large hobbyist community enjoys building and 
tinkering with them. Drones are making farming easier. Farmers use camera equipped-UAVs to 
conduct autonomous crop monitoring. This makes monitoring large swaths of land much easier, 
and aids in determining fertilizer and pesticide use. The FAA is concerned and still drafting the 
regulations for agricultural drones. Near-collisions with passenger jets have occurred.
16
 
 Drones have clearly entered American consciousness and society. Little attention, 
however, has been paid to how America got here, how it became a drone nation. This thesis 
seeks to counter the “New Drone” misconception, the general ignorance of drone history present 
in the historiography, and popular perception of the subject. Actually, there has been nearly a 
century of American drone development. 
 Chapter one, “The “New Drone” Misconception: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the 
World Wars,” examines America’s first experiments with military drones. Charles Kettering, 
Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold, and Reginald Denny were among the first to recognize UAV 
potential and garner American support. Arguably the main motivation for drone use--removing 
American soldiers from danger--was first recognized during this period. These overlooked early 
                                                          
15
 Nicholas Carlson, "The Real Reason Amazon Announced Delivery Drones Last Night: $3 Million In 
Free Advertising On Cyber Monday," Business Insider, December 02, 2013, accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-amazon-announced-delivery-drones-2013-12. 
16





drones suggest that contemporary parallels, such as imprecision and civilian casualties, are not 
new. 
 Chapter two, “The ‘Inevitability’ of Drones and the Cold War” questions the assumption 
that drone adoption was inevitable. Such perceived inevitability creates a futuristic image, with 
connotations of superiority leading to blanket acceptance. Examining drone development during 
the Cold War Era reveals a very different reality. Drones faced major obstacles, including 
technical limitations, expense, and competition from other emerging technologies. It took until 
the 1990s for drones to truly prove themselves.  
 Just as drone technology is not new, neither are the facile policies which guide its use. 
Chapter three, “American Counterinsurgency: The Phoenix Program in Vietnam and 
Contemporary Drone Policy,” is a comparative analysis of American counterinsurgency efforts. 
The integration of drone strikes into counterinsurgency efforts, especially in unofficial war zones 
such as Pakistan, has led to popular interest and concern. Many of the same problems 
(inefficiency, civilian casualties, corruption, and public outrage) that have plagued drone use also 
haunted America’s efforts with the Phoenix program.  
Because of the potential drones hold today, careful consideration of their problematic 
history is essential. Protecting Americans from war by replacing soldiers with drones has been a 
century long effort. Yet drone usage has consistently produced the same warping effect on 
American experiences in war.  Expensive and technologically limited UAVs have been deployed 
inefficiently. The covert nature of many drone programs bred distrust, encouraged immoral use, 
and shielded those responsible from condemnation. Even worse, these efforts accomplished little 




THE “NEW DRONE” MISCONCEPTION: UNMANNED AERIAL 
VEHICLES IN THE WORLD WARS 
Popular perception of America’s drones sees them as a new technology, a seemingly 
futuristic revolution of warfare which allows unmanned aircraft to perform important military 
tasks without a pilot physically present in the vehicle. In reality, this belief is a misconception. 
Few realize how long Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been a part of the American 
military. First receiving military backing in World War I and continuing throughout the 20
th
 
century, drones have long been used for combat, training, and reconnaissance tasks by the 
American military. This history of drone use can provide perspective for modern drone policy. 
Recent expansion of drone use has received a great deal of attention from citizens, media, and 
politicians. Their primary utilization in the Middle East for surveillance and assassination has 
created concerns over international law and civilian casualties. There is a price to be paid: the 
more drones are used for questionable military actions, the worse their public perception 
becomes. This chapter examines early UAVs to refute the “new drone” misconception, 
demonstrate that drones have accomplished more than their latest uses, and show how issues 
concerning drone policy were dealt with in the past.  
 America’s use of drones greatly expanded during the War on Terror. Drones are valuable 
military technology, recognized for their combat and surveillance uses. News sources frequently 
portray drones as the wave of the future in military aeronautics, forgetting significant earlier uses 
of drones. 
 This misconception of UAVs as new has been perpetrated by respected media outlets 
such as The Washington Post, The Economist, and The New York Times. A documentary for the 
Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Nova series, “Rise of the Drones” claims to expose viewers 
7 
  
to “a new chapter of aviation history.”
17
 In this pursuit of the new, the documentary ignores 
decades of early drone use as too costly and technologically limited for meaningful examination. 
Not only does “Rise of the Drones” ignore history, but it does not note that modern drones have 
these same problems. Similarly, a New York Times article entitled “A History of Drone Warfare” 
only goes back to 2001 with the initial weapons testing of the Predator drone.
18
  
 The media give aeronautical engineer Abe Karem and the Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA) the credit for America’s drones. Karem, whose drone prototype 
Amber was the basis of the modern Predator drone, and DARPA, which developed many of the 
technologies used by modern drones, have certainly made important contributions, but 
presenting only their recent accomplishments is misleading. The Economist calls Karem “The 
dronefather,” giving him sole credit for creating “the robotic plane that transformed the way 
modern warfare is waged.”
19
 Similarly, the Washington Post’s treatment of the history of UAVs 
focuses only on Karem’s contributions.
20
  
 Past scholarship on early drones is frequently incomplete. Most accounts begin with 
those built by Ryan Aeronautical Company for use in the Cold War. Thomas P. Ehrhard’s Air 
Force UAVs: The Secret History gives a short history of America’s drones, but does not consider 
pre-Vietnam drones worthy of coverage. Kenneth P. Werrell’s, The Evolution of the Cruise 
Missile, discusses precursors, but as the title of his 1985 book suggests, in relation to cruise 
missiles, not UAVs. Aeronautic enthusiasts are devout compilers of data but offer little more 
                                                          
17
 Rise of the Drones, Directed by Peter Yost, (2013), Television Broadcast, Accessed February 24, 2013, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/rise-of-the-drones.html. 
18
 "A History of Drone Warfare," New York Times (New York), May 24, 2013, A8 sec. 
19
  "Brain Scan: The Dronefather," Economist.com, (December 1, 2012), Accessed January 30, 2013. 
20
 Peter Finn, "Rise of the Drone: From Calif. Garage to Multibillion-dollar Defense Industry," Washington 
Post, (December 23, 2011), Accessed January 31, 2013. 
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than factual information. America has been using drones for most of the 20
th
 century, something 
largely ignored by these sources. 
 Though Abe Karem has been deemed the “dronefather” by the media, other people such 
as Charles Kettering, Reginald Denny, and especially Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold were 
instrumental in developing UAVs. Hap Arnold’s contributions to early UAVs are briefly 
mentioned in biographies but are overshadowed by his numerous other accomplishments. 
Frequently called a pioneer
21
, Arnold was one of America’s first military pilots. He learned to fly 
directly from the Wright brothers and received the second-ever pilot’s license issued by the 
military.
22
 As a pilot he was a two-time winner of the Mackey trophy, awarded for “the most 
meritorious flight of the year.”
23
 By 1938 he had become the commanding officer of the United 
States Army Air Corps (USAAC), a position he held throughout World War II, as the Air Force 
became a separate service arm, the United States Army Air Force (USAAF). Arnold expanded 
America’s pitiful air power of “2,000 airplanes and 21,000 personnel” to the largest aeronautical 
war machine the world had ever seen with “79,000 airplanes and 2,300,000 personnel.”
24
 Arnold 
should also be recognized for his support of early drones which paved the way for later 
innovations and aided the development of today’s drones. 
 
 
                                                          
21
 "Hap Arnold Lecture Series, Air War College, Air University," Hap Arnold Lecture Series, Air War 
College, Air University, accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/outreach-program/index.htm; 
Flint O. DuPre, "Biographies : General Henry H. Arnold," The Official Website of the U.S. Air Force, accessed 
February 19, 2013, http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=4551. 
22
 Thomas M. Coffey, HAP: The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built It, General Henry H. 
"Hap" Arnold (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 48-53. 
23
 "Trophies and Awards at the National Air and Space Museum," Smithsonian: National Air and Space 
Museum, accessed April 23, 2013, http://airandspace.si.edu/research/aero/trophy/mackay.cfm. 
24




The Kettering Bug 
 The first UAV to receive military support was developed during World War I. The 
official name for this early drone was “Liberty Eagle,” but it is more commonly referred to as the 
Kettering “Bug” to honor its inventor, Charles F. Kettering, who had been assigned to evaluate 
the possibility of developing an aerial torpedo.  Kettering, eventually a major figure at General 
Motors, had already established himself as an outstanding engineer. He invented the Electric 
Self-Starter which helped Cadillac win the Dewar Trophy in 1913, the highest automotive prize 
at the time.
25
 He witnessed the successful flight of a small pilotless plane guided by a simple 
auto-pilot system. Kettering insisted that this proof of concept flight demonstrated the 
plausibility of aerial torpedoes, and he personally directed the Bug’s expansion.
26
 
           
               Fig. 1   Charles Kettering27                        Fig 2. The Kettering “Bug”28 
 As seen in Fig. 2, the Kettering “Bug” was launched with a four-wheeled dolly and 
portable track. The Bug had an internal system of “pre-set pneumatic and electrical controls” 
which acted like modern auto-pilot systems, stabilizing and guiding the drone to its target. The 
                                                          
25
 "Kettering, Charles F.," Generations of GM RSS, accessed February 27, 2014, http://history. 
gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Kettering%2C_Charles_F. 
26
 Andreas Parsch, "Dayton Wright/Kettering Liberty Eagle "Bug," (May 12, 2005), Accessed April 01, 
2013, http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/bug.html. 
27
 Charles F. Kettering, Engineers Club of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, accessed January 30, 2014, 
http://www.daytoninnovationlegacy.org/kettering.html. 
28
 “KETTERING AERIAL TORPEDO “BUG,”” National Museum of The US Air Force, March 21, 2007, 
Accessed February 11, 2013. http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=320.  
10 
  
amount of flight time needed to reach a target was programmed into the Bug, and once it had 
flown for that amount of time, presumably reaching its target, the engine shut off. After 
deactivation, the wings released, plunging the drone and the explosives it carried to the ground 
where it detonated on impact.
29
  
 Built to be a self-sacrificing weapon, the Kettering Bug was constructed of cheap 
materials. The body was made of papier-mâché, its wings made of cardboard. Despite its 
disposable nature, the Bug’s 40-horsepower engine allowed it to carry up to 300 pounds of 
explosives and reach a speed of 50 mph.
30
  
Though the Kettering Bug bears Charles Kettering’s name, Hap Arnold was also 
instrumental in its development. Despite frequent requests for a combat position during the war, 
he was kept in Washington, D.C. During World War I, Arnold was the second-highest ranking 
officer in the War Department’s Air Division, and for a majority of the war, the highest ranking 
pilot in Washington. He had become a Colonel by August 1917, the youngest in the Army at the 
time.
31
 His relatively-rare expertise was likely the reason for his appointment to multiple aviation 
boards such as the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board, for which he was to “investigate new 
types of air-craft and accessories and to make recommendations covering types that would be 
placed into production by the Army and Navy.”
32
 He saw the potential that an unmanned-plane 




 Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: Developing Air Power for the United States Air Force during the 
First Century of Powered Flight (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: History Office, Aeronautical Systems 
Center, Air Force Materiel Command, 2002), 22. 
31
 Henry Harley Arnold, Global Mission. (New York, NY: Harper, 1949), 48. 
32
 Henry H. Arnold, World War I Duties, Journal, From Library of Congress, The Henry Harley Arnold 
Papers, 1903-1989, Microfilm, reel 3.  
11 
  
bomb would have for World War I’s trench warfare, and used his position in the War 
Department to support the Kettering Bug.
33
 
Driven by a passion to advance aeronautical technology, Arnold also pushed military 
leaders to support the Bug.
34
 Arnold invited military leaders to witness a test flight of the Bug at 
the Dayton air field. However, the Bug malfunctioned, sputtered in the air, and fell dangerously 




 The Bug never saw combat. Its successful October 2, 1918, flight test took place just a 
month before the Armistice with Germany.
36
 According to Arnold, “it was planned to launch 
thousands every day against German strong points, concentration areas, munitions plants, etc.”
37
 
Reports of the Bug’s flight tests boast of its range and accuracy. Despite this optimism, there 
were concerns over the Bug’s reliability, particularly if it flew over Allied troops.
38
 It is unclear 
what the origins of concern were, though a failed test before military leaders in Dayton surely 
did not help. The Bug’s cheap components and the revolutionary nature of the project itself may 
have also worried military leaders. 
Since the Bug was never used in combat, it has largely been ignored. Fewer than fifty 
were built before the Armistice.  Even though the Kettering Bug did not actively contribute to 
the war effort, it was still significant. It reveals the American military’s desire for a relatively 
accurate way of bombing targets from the air without risking the lives of pilots. It was the first 
                                                          
33
 Arnold, Global Mission, 74-75. 
34
 DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air 
Power (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 118. 
35
 Ibid, 23. 
36
 Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose, 22. 
37
 Arnold, Global Mission, 76. 
38
 Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose, 22. 
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instance in which UAVs, as opposed to piloted aircrafts, received military backing and financial 
support.
39
 Experience gained with the Kettering Bug would also be important in coming years, 
once remote-controlled UAVs were developed.  
Experiments with the Kettering Bug continued into the 1920s but ended because of a lack 
of funding. After World War I, Kettering returned to developing cars rather than planes. 
However, when America entered World War II, Kettering wanted to give his Bug another go.  
Kettering Bug Part II 
Throughout 1942, Charles Kettering struggled to get the USAAF to support the Kettering 
Bug. His motivation is unclear. Perhaps he wanted to have his invention receive the combat 
experience denied earlier. His communications with the USAAF suggest he had high-hopes for 
the Bug and believed it capable of being an effective weapon against the Germans. However, all 
of his supposed optimism should be tempered by the fact that he had become General Motors’ 
head of research; production of the bug would mean the purchase of General Motors products. 
Another reason to discount Kettering’s confidence was the numerous problems with the project.  
 Over twenty years had passed between the WWI Bug and the new attempt during WWII. 
The time lapse meant new technology would be used. The initial Bug’s 40-horsepower engine 
was replaced by a new “8-cylinder 2-cycle 200 horsepower liquid cooled engine.”
40
 The 
improved capabilities increased the Bug’s speed from 50mph to 200mph, and it could now carry 
500, rather than 300, pounds of explosives.
41
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 Despite these improvements, plans for the Bug’s implementation still relied on outdated 
targeting technology. The new prototypes were still using the World War I era targeting system. 
This meant the drone would fly a preset distance and then plunge to the ground and explode. 
Army-Air Force analysis showed this to be wildly inaccurate. If the weather were properly 
forecast, and the Bug only had to travel 50 miles, then it could strike within a half mile of the 
target. However, Army-Air Force projections said that in uncertain weather conditions, or when 
traveling longer distances, the Bug could end up landing up to 20 miles away from the target.
42
  
 Even at short distances, the Bug’s preset data targeting was too inaccurate to fit into 
America’s strategic bombing campaign in 1942. An April 16, 1942 USAAF analysis prepared at 
Commanding General Hap Arnold’s request
43
 rejects the idea of using Bugs to indiscriminately 
bomb the enemy, fearing it would increase their resistance. Arnold underlined the section of the 
report suggesting no Bugs be produced using the preset data targeting, further damning the 




 Ambitious new technologies were considered to improve the Bug’s accuracy. Homing 
devices were under development. So were controls which used heat, light, sound, and radar 
transmissions. However, in mid-1942 when the Bug was being evaluated, these new targeting 
technologies were unfinished. Instead, it was decided that the Bugs, if implemented, would need 
to be radio controlled to be accurate. The Navy hoped to improve the Bug’s accuracy by 
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installing television cameras to improve guidance. Arnold seemed favorable to radio controlled 
Bugs, adding a hand-written note that accuracy would be “very much” improved.
45
  
 There were other problems with the Kettering Bug. Special facilities and squadrons 
would need to be created for the Bug operators. Operators needed training to hone the skills 
required to operate the Bugs accurately. Control airplanes would be needed to carry operators as 
they remotely piloted the Bugs. The Bugs would require storage space, and their design was 
more cumbersome than the traditional ordinance it was essentially replicating. Ultimately, the 
fact that the Bug only carried 500 pounds of explosives with a limited range of 400 miles led the 
Army-Air Force to label it “inadequate.”
46
 
Kettering did not give up. In response to the critique of the Bug’s size and limited 
capabilities, Kettering devised a “Double Bug.” The Double Bug would be able to travel 1,000 
miles and carry 2,000 pounds of explosives. However, even these capabilities were considered to 
be the bare minimum in order to “warrant the trouble and expense.”
47
  
Still undeterred, Kettering appealed directly to military brass. Beginning his letter with 
“My dear Colonel,” Kettering promoted the Bug to Colonel Grandison Gardner, at the Air Force 
Proving Ground Command, Eglin Field, Florida. Kettering pointed out that the Bugs General 
Motors had produced fit the specifications requested by the Air Corps, specifications which had 
previously been “thought to be sufficient.” Kettering termed the Bug an efficient weapon, saying 
it “uses no strategic material and consists of only the essential parts necessary to fly.”  However, 
the Bug was supposed to crash into its target and explode, meaning the sacrifice of a small plane, 
a TV camera, equipment for radio control, and a sophisticated new engine. Indeed, it was this 
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engine Kettering cared about the most. Kettering argued that “The only reason we were willing 
to undertake this job” was the utilization of the sophisticated motor General Motors had created. 
Its development had cost over 1,000 man hours and, without specifics, he claimed it had 
“characteristics never before obtained.” Hoping an old acquaintance would be more receptive, 
Kettering asked Gardner to forward his pro-Bug letter to General Arnold.
48
 
Gardner sent a harsh report about the Bug along with the forwarded letter. Gardner told 
Arnold that five experimental Bugs had been tested, though he only mentions the most recent as 
having “performed very well.” Gardner pointed out that takeoff was still an issue for the Bugs.
49
 
They were launching them with a catapult.
50
 The proposed use of television cameras to improve 
accuracy had not yet been proven effective. The Bug had not demonstrated that it could hit its 
target. Gardner seemed annoyed with Kettering, saying “Although those connected with the 
development of this weapon are highly optimistic as to the results they expect to obtain, it is felt 




With General Motors behind the Bug, large-scale production was not an issue. However, 
the numerous problems raised during the testing process seem to have ended the efforts to use 
the Bug. Arnold conducted a meeting with Kettering and William Knudsen, also from General 
Motors, to discuss the Bug’s strategic merit. The three men discussed several issues raised 
including “the availability of bases; of targets; the cost; production; comparison of production 
between the Bugs and heavy bombers; raw materials needed for the two types of weapons.” The 
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three agreed to terminate the project because even with several technological improvements, the 
Bug’s short range only allowed it to hit occupied cities in France, Belgium, and Holland; not the 
desired target of interior Germany.
52
 Despite the efforts of Charles Kettering, Hap Arnold, and 
others within the Air Corps, the Bug had failed to be combat-ready in both World Wars. 
Although the Kettering Bug failed, the experience gained influenced the development of the first 
military drone to actually be deployed in combat. 
Operation Aphrodite 
In late 1943, about a year and a half after the experiments with the updated Kettering 
Bug, General Arnold ordered Grandison Gardner, now a Brigadier General, to conduct a new 
UAV project.
53
 Officially named Operation Aphrodite, the project produced the most significant 
UAVs yet developed.  Overseen by Hap Arnold, the new drones had elements of the Kettering 
Bug and newer drones. Arnold’s support of Operation Aphrodite stemmed from his continued 
fascination with developing new technologies for warfare.
 54
 Though both attempts with the 
Kettering Bug had failed, his autobiography reveals he desperately wanted to develop combat 
drones.
55
 Arnold and Gardner’s link to the Kettering Bug is significant because the new drones 
borrowed heavily from earlier drone projects.  
During World War II, the USAAF repeatedly attempted to conserve aircraft resources. A 
major focus was placed on conserving aircraft through repairs before they would finally be 
                                                          
52
 Global Mission, 260-261. 
53
 Dik A. Daso, Maj, Architects of American Air Superiority: Gen. Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore Von 
Karman (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997), PDF, 72. 
54
 Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians,(Lawrence; University Press of Kansas, 1993), 78-79. 
55
 Arnold, Global Mission. 76. 
17 
  
designated “War Weary,” removed from tactical deployment, and replaced by functioning 
aircraft. Operation Aphrodite took the USAAF’s conservation efforts one step further.
56
 
The idea behind Operation Aphrodite was to use surplus, war-weary B-17 and B-24 
planes, remove their weapons, armor, and interiors, and pack the planes with explosives. The use 
of these war-weary planes led to the explosive drones being nicknamed “Weary Willies.”
57
 This 
rather unprepossessing nickname was a reference to the popular tragic clown, Weary Willy, 
played by Emmett Kelly in the Ringling Brothers Circus.
58
 Weary Willies functioned similarly to 
Japanese Kamikaze planes, crashing into their targets and exploding. However, Weary Willies 
did not require the sacrifice of human pilots. Weary Willies were not completely unmanned, 
requiring pilots to take off. However, the pilots then bailed out, and the planes could be remotely 
controlled into their targets.
59
 During operations, Weary Willies were not controlled from the 
ground but from a plane that followed.
60
  
It is unsurprising that Aphrodite’s Weary Willies borrowed heavily from the Kettering 
Bug. Operationally speaking, the two drones were nearly identical; both were explosive-stuffed 
planes guided by radio control to their targets. However, Aphrodite avoided many of the 
problems which plagued the Kettering Bug. Aphrodite’s use of elderly planes meant new planes 
were unnecessary. Aircraft storage space would be created. Aphrodite’s recycled planes had 
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 pounds of explosives Weary 
Willies could carry was satisfactory. 
                           
Fig 3. Henry “Hap” Arnold
63
     Fig. 4 A Weary Willie drone taking off.
64
            Fig. 5 Joseph P. Kennedy Jr.
65
 
Initially, the goal of Operation Aphrodite was to destroy German V-1 missile sites. 
Traditional American bombers had had little luck destroying these heavily-protected locations, 
considered “practically invulnerable to normal bombing attacks.” The hope was that unmanned, 
bomb-stuffed planes would be able to crash into the missile sites, and destroy them without 
risking the lives of pilots.
66
 
The Weary Willies did not live up to these high hopes. In combat, Weary Willies did not 
fare any better than piloted aircraft against the German defenses. The fact that Weary Willies 
were recycled, deteriorating aircraft that had been stripped of their armor contributed to their 
lack of success. Limited maneuverability through remote control lessened the chances for Weary 
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Willies to succeed. German anti-aircraft gunners were able to shoot down the drones before they 
reached their target destinations.
67
  
 Weary Willies also suffered from safety issues, one of which altered the course of 
American political history. By 1944 the U.S. Navy had developed an offshoot of Operation 
Aphrodite, Operation Anvil. The Navy felt that attaching television cameras and monitors to the 
Weary Willies would improve the aim of the operators using remote controls.
68
 The pilot in the 
Navy’s first use of Aphrodite drones was Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., the older brother of John F. 
Kennedy. Kennedy’s role as a Weary Willie pilot has falsely been described as a “suicide 
mission.”
69
 While piloting an explosive-packed plane specifically designed to blow up was 
certainly risky, Kennedy was only supposed to get the plane off the ground and then bail out, 
once operators using remote controls in the accompanying mother plane had taken over. An 
unknown technical problem, perhaps related to malfunctioning circuitry, caused the premature 
detonation of the explosives in Kennedy’s plane, killing him and his co-pilot Wilford Willy.
70
 
This deadly mishap would have caused second thoughts about Operation Aphrodite no matter 
who the pilot was. Because it was Joseph Kennedy Jr., fear of his politically-connected father’s 
reaction “caused much consternation at many military headquarters.”
71
  
 The final problem with Operation Aphrodite was that Weary Willies contradicted 
America’s strategic bombing doctrine, to use precision bombing against military and industrial 
sites, and attempt to avoid civilian casualties. As the Weary Willies were used, it became 
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apparent that they “would fall on the Germans indiscriminately.”
72
 In October 1944, the United 
States Strategic Air Forces decided to use Weary Willies against German cities.
 73
 Arnold was 
very supportive of this idea.  
Something had clearly shifted in Arnold’s thinking. A report evaluating the Kettering 
Bug in 1942 attacked the idea of using it for indiscriminate bombing. The report states “there is 
considerable evidence to show that its (indiscriminate area bombing) results may be harmful 
from the stiffened moral resistance of the victims.” Arnold even underlined the section of the 
report which said none of these inaccurate Kettering Bugs should be produced.
74
 However, by 
November 1944, Arnold’s interactions with Aphrodite suggest he was no longer concerned with 
the death of enemy civilians.  
 Allied losses by late 1944 were a major factor for Arnold’s support of Aphrodite, 
something which was lacking when he dismissed the Kettering Bug. On November 23, 1944, 
Arnold wrote a letter to Lieutenant General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, outlining his ideas for Weary 
Willy use. Though Weary Willies were primarily used against military targets, such as the V-1 
missile sites, Arnold wanted to use them “as an irritant and possibly a means of breaking down 
the morale of the people of interior Germany.” He approved of Britain’s nighttime area 
bombings and wanted to emulate their actions. He specifically designated Cologne as a target, 
suggesting they simply launch the plane, have the pilot bail out, and let it fall anywhere within 
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the city limits. Arnold told Spaatz that he was ready to organize the logistics: pilots, crews, 
experts, and planes in order to carry out this assault on the German populace.
75
  
 Arnold seems bitter and vengeful for the terror Germany wreaked on Britain during The 
Blitz. Arnold wrote “My idea would be to turn them loose to land all over Germany so that the 
Germans would be just as much afraid of our war weary planes on account of not knowing just 
where they were going to hit, as are the people in England from the buzz bombs and rockets.” 
Arnold said the unmanned-planes should simply be launched towards a German city. As the war-
weary planes were shot down, and aircraft debris rained on the city, the indiscriminate danger 
meant “the psychological effect on the morale of the German people would be much greater.” 
The strategic justification for this random assault was that the Germans would have to be 
constantly prepared. The ever-present need to shoot down incoming planes meant the Germans 
would have to commit fighter pilots and functioning aircrafts for defense. America would only 
sacrifice decrepit planes. Even if Arnold’s plan would tie up German resources, it is 
disconcerting that he would consider a strategy essentially identical to that of the Nazis as 
acceptable. He does not voice any concern for German civilians in the letter.
76
  
On January 1, 1945, one of the drones crashed into a residential area.
77
 Operation 
Aphrodite was ended around a month later, after the Yalta Conference. Officials recognized that 
the program contradicted the official, often ignored, American strategy of attempting to avoid 
civilian casualties. The British also feared that Aphrodite would prompt the Germans to expand 
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 Lt. General James Doolittle dismissed the operation, saying “this whole 
project is put together with baling wire, chicken guts, and ignorance.”
79
 
 Hap Arnold’s evaluation of Operation Aphrodite was more favorable. Arnold’s first 
justification of the program combined economy and efficiency. Arnold saw that recycling the B-
17 and B-24 planes would make space in crowded American Air fields. Reusing and destroying 
old planes would also guarantee that new and improved planes would be manufactured. Arnold 
insisted that non-precision bombing was acceptable as long as it caused damage to the enemy.
80
 
As late as February 6 1945, two days into Yalta, Arnold was still actively supporting Aphrodite. 
He sent orders to Gardner that equipment should be developed that would make Weary Willies 
completely unmanned by eliminating the need for the pilots who got the planes airborne before 
bailing out.
81
   
 Perhaps the most significant contribution Arnold made to the development of drones was 
the argument he made in support of Operation Aphrodite. Arnold asserted that one should “try 
and kill as many men and destroy as much property as you can. If you can get mechanical 
machines to do this, then you are saving lives at the outset.”
82
 Even today, performing combat 
missions without risking the lives of American servicemen remains one of the strongest 
justifications for the use of drones.  
 This is the obvious explanation for Arnold’s persistent commitment to Operation 
Aphrodite. Arnold wanted to spare as many Americans as he could from the horrors of war. In 
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1943 Arnold spent December in Italy. Despite his long military career, Arnold seems shaken by 
the things he witnessed. His journal entry for December 11, 1943, is filled with disturbing 
imagery. Entitled “Modern battle,” he describes war-ravaged Naples. Arnold first emphasizes the 
mechanized nature of the war: “Modern battle – jeeps and mud, trucks and tanks, more mud, 
trucks and road jams… Villages and towns demolished, partly demolished. Destruction and 
devastation everywhere.” He then turns to the devastation this mechanization wreaks on man:  
Hospitals, field and evacuation, ambulances, operating room, removing bomb and shell                    
splinters from the soldier’s head, pulling a mangled hand together, tying a body together 
after a shell fragment tore loose a hip and almost all of a buttock, wounds in the 
abdomen, holes in back and abdomen the size of a football, blood transfusions. . . Nurses 
doing their part, working overtime, smiling. . . A man with only half his innards dying, 
but still smiling and saying, “I’m all right.”
83
 
Arnold had been spared from combat. He attended West Point, served briefly in the 
Philippines, and then became one of America’s first military pilots. His aeronautical expertise 
obliged him to spend WWI in Washington where his service was considered more valuable than 
in battle.
 84
 It is unlikely that his experience in Italy was the first time he witnessed the carnage 
caused by war, but considering his visceral experience, his enthusiasm for using drones rather 
than risking lives is understandable.  
 Operation Aphrodite and Weary Willies had little impact on the outcome of World War 
II. Despite this, it was still the first instance in which America deployed drones for combat 
purposes. Though Aphrodite failed, it elicited a philosophy of war from Hap Arnold similar to 
collateral damage, the questionable military doctrine employed for drone use in modern times.  
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Also during World War II, Reginald Denny, a British immigrant, made another important 
contribution to America’s development of drones. Denny had two passions, acting and 
aeronautics. In a career spanning from 1915-1966 he had 186 acting roles, and it was his pursuit 
of Hollywood success which brought him to America.
85
 However, Denny had served as a British 
pilot during World War I and he also found success in American aeronautics.  Though he was 
not a major player, Denny fed his aeronautical interests and capitalized on his fame by opening 
“Reginald Denny’s Hobby Shop” to sell radio-controlled airplanes.
 86
 
His hobby shop continued to function as a retailer for RC airplane enthusiasts, but by 
1935 Denny’s business had expanded to include the “Radioplane” company.
87
 Denny realized 
that his cheap RC planes could be used for target practice in training anti-aircraft gunners. In 
1935 he successfully demonstrated his RP-1(Radioplane) prototype to the U.S. Army. Within 
four years he had produced four iterations of the Radioplane for military use. 
88
 Though some 
Radioplanes were purchased by the U.S. Army in the late ‘30s; America’s entrance into World 
War II led to large orders, nearly 1,000 in 1943, from both the Army and Navy. Demand was so 
high that throughout the war other manufacturers were used to produce thousands of Denny’s 
Radioplanes.
89
 With his Radioplane, Denny had created the first UAV to be widely adopted by 
the American military.  
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Fig. 6 Denny’s Hobby Shop in 1961
90
               Fig. 7 Denny in his workroom,
91
            Fig. 8 The Radioplane
92
 
 Launched from a catapult, the Radioplane was remotely controlled from the ground. If 
not destroyed during target practice it could deploy a parachute and be recovered.
93
 The 
Radioplane had a simple two-cylinder, two-cycle engine with six horsepower. Despite its weak 
engine, its top speed was 85 miles per hour because the Radioplane was small and light.
94
 
Denny’s UAVS were target drones, rather than combat drones, such as the Kettering Bug 
or Weary Willies. Numerous different target drones would be produced throughout the 20
th
 
century and continue to be used today. Eventually, Denny’s Radioplane Company was obsolete, 
thanks to more complex target drones produced by other manufacturers. In 1952 the defense 
technology company Northrop purchased the rights to the Radioplane.
95
 Though he was no 
longer involved with the Radioplane, Denny’s early target drone led to important advances in 
UAV technology during the Cold War. 
During the World Wars, drones produced few tangible results on the battlefield. 
However, Arnold’s extensive experience with drones and other new war technologies (long-
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range bombers and atomic bombs) had a significant impact on his thinking, contributing to his 
advocacy for a more intelligent and modern approach to warfare. Arnold would retire soon after 
the end of World War II, but he had dedicated his career to advancing the future of aviation. 
During both World Wars he helped push aeronautical innovation through UAV development. 
These experiences convinced him that drones would play a major role in American military 
aviation. In his V-J (Victory over Japan) day speech, Arnold sought to convince his fellow 
servicemen as well. Congratulating his listeners on their victory, Arnold said “We have just won 
a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes.” He then turned to the future and, likely 
reflecting on his experiences with UAVs, said “The next war may be fought with airplanes with 
no men in them at all. It certainly will be fought with planes so far superior to those we have now 
that there will be no basis for comparison.” Arnold recognized the potential that drones would 
have for the future of warfare and took steps to help later drones to succeed.
96
 
 A significant and long-lasting contribution came in December 1945 when Arnold 
successfully lobbied the War Department and Congress to create Project RAND (Research and 
Development), an experimental “one year study on the future of warfare.” Arnold explained to 
the War Department that it was necessary to bring in civilian scientists and researchers to help 
drive technological innovation for the military. He complained that previously there had not been 
enough collaboration toward innovation among the different branches of the military, 
governmental agencies, and industry. In his appeal for Project RAND, Arnold argued that 
“scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."
 97
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Arnold also advocated for the future of drones in his official War Reports. Published 
along with those of Army General George C. Marshall and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, 
Arnold’s contributions reflect a sense of hesitant optimism. The Army and Navy were long 
established branches of the military; the Air Force was not. Though air power had performed 
well during World War II, when the War Reports came out in 1947 it was still the subservient 
“Army Air Force.” Within the year the Air Force would separate from the Army, but Arnold had 
spent his life serving a subservient military branch. He cautions against allowing America’s 
military might to deteriorate, and echoing his experience with Project RAND, insists on the 
necessity for greater scientific research and development to produce more advanced aircraft. 
Notably, advanced pilotless planes are listed first in his “New Concepts” to be developed.
98
 
Project RAND was renewed until 1948 when it became the independent RAND 
Corporation, to this day one of the most important military think tanks. Drones helped convince 
Arnold of the necessity of RAND; RAND helped convince the military of the potential of drones 








                                                          
98
 George C. Marshall, Ernest J. King, and H. H. Arnold, The War Reports(Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 
1947), 462-466. 
99





THE “INEVITABILITY” OF DRONES AND THE COLD WAR 
The Cold War, along with the 1990s, was the most significant period for drone 
development. Driven by covert surveillance needs, there were numerous attempts to produce a 
viable drone, but with little success. The failures are often ignored by enthusiasts. Technological 
determinism--the unquestioning belief in the ability of new technologies to solve society’s 
problems--has taken hold today.  This can be seen in the misconception of the inevitability of 
drone adoption. Earlier unsuccessful models are overlooked, focusing on the birth of the 
successful Predator. The relative ignorance of this drone history creates a specious air of 
inevitability. New technologies are rarely questioned, especially if their record seems successful. 
In reality, during the Cold War, drones faced numerous obstacles, including technological 
limitations, expense, and competition from manned aerial surveillance (the U-2) and satellites. In 
addition, when the potential of UAVs finally emerged in the 1990s, the threat of foreign drones 
was quickly integrated into American military analysis. 
The military currently sees increased drone use as the inevitable future of aerial warfare. 
In 2013, the air force predicted that, within a decade, a third of all its attack planes would be 
unmanned. More drone pilots are being trained than fighter and bomber pilots combined.
100
 
Drones have surpassed manned planes in flight hours.
101
 Drones are being promoted so heavily 
that it is difficult to find enough pilots, though some problems are tied to poor promotion rates or 
negative comparisons to conventional pilots.
102
 Military think tanks, such as the International 
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Institute for Strategic Studies, fully support this drone expansion, recognizing that drones have 
proven themselves and are becoming cheaper.
103
 Increased integration of drones seems likely 
now and for the twenty-first century. 
Why Drones? 
 The surveillance needs of the Cold War were the primary motivation for drone 
development. In 1954 President Eisenhower first authorized reconnaissance missions using the 
U-2 spy plane. The plane was revolutionary at the time, capable of flying at 70,000 feet and up to 
4,000 miles without refueling. The altitude was initially too high for Soviet anti-air defenses. 
Eisenhower limited his use of the U-2 during most of his administration, but in early 1960, 
seeking information on Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) development, he 
authorized more missions in Soviet airspace. This resulted in the 1960 Gary Francis Powers U-2 
incident, in which the pilot was shot down. The Soviet Union recovered incriminating evidence: 
Powers alive, remnants of the plane, and the film. International scandal erupted after American 
denials of guilt and Soviet revelations, ruining a summit in Paris between the United States, 
Soviet Union, Britain, and France, as well as intensifying Cold War tensions.
104
 Avoiding these 
dangers, both political and to pilots, was a major factor in greater American drone development.  
 The dangers of aerial surveillance were frequently revealed. During the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, two years after the Powers incident, Maj. Rudolph Anderson Jr.’s U-2 was shot down. No 
longer able to hide at 70,000 feet, U-2s faced a serious threat from anti-air defenses. Air Force 
leaders considered but rejected reconnaissance drone prototypes. Officials did not want to risk 
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revealing this new technological development to the Soviet Union.
105
 Discussions in 1965 
between Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance 
led to a memo which recognized that “The use of U-2’s over Communist China is becoming 
increasingly hazardous because of SAMS and MIG 21 attack techniques.” McNamara and Vance 
would have preferred using drones to U-2s, but could not because of technical difficulties.
106
 On 
April 18, 1968, a manned surveillance plane was shot down over North Korea, killing thirty-one 
Americans. President Nixon was criticized for sending airmen into such a hostile situation; 
drones were considered the answer.
107
 
 The drone solutions contemplated in Cuba, and implemented in Korea, were actually 
modified target drones, Reginald Denny’s original concept. Operating out of San Diego 
California, Ryan Aeronautical manufactured target drones for weapons testing and training.
108
 
By 1962, the company had turned its Fire Bee target drone into the Fire Fly reconnaissance 
drone. Over time, Ryan Aeronautical would produce more than twenty variations of the Fire Bee. 
The Fire Fly was soon replaced with a more complex iteration, the Lightning Bug, the only drone 
success story of the Cold War.
109
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 Fig. 9. An original Fire Bee drone110                  Fig. 10. UAVs made by Ryan Aeronautical.111 
The Lightning Bug 
 The Lightening Bug reconnaissance drone was used extensively during the Vietnam War 
to monitor China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. It was capable of flying at high altitudes, 
similar to the U-2 spy plane, and was virtually untraceable by radar. These drones, which were 
both remotely-controlled and auto-piloted over their targets, took pictures and proceeded to 
predetermined locations where they would parachute for later recovery. In total, 3,435 
Lightening Bug missions were flown throughout South East Asia between 1964 and 1975.
112
 
 The Lightning Bug’s success was not typical of Cold War drones, but the obstacles it 
faced (technical limitations, competition from other surveillance technologies, and expense) 
were. The UAVs often veered off their preprogrammed courses, producing pictures of no 
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strategic value. They were damaged when parachuting to the ground, resulting in the 
implementation of midair retrieval system (MARS). This solution not only made operations 
more complex but also less effective. Initially, forty percent of lightning bugs were lost due to 




 Though not specified in their report, the drones discussed by McNamara and Vance in 
1965 were definitely Lightning Bugs. Despite the drone failure, aerial reconnaissance over China 
was still needed, and U-2s chosen for the task. Rather than drones, emphasis was put on further 
developing another manned reconnaissance technology, project OXCART.
114
 OXCART was 
designed to be the successor to the U-2, capable of higher altitudes and flight speeds.
115
 
 In a study for the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute, Thomas P. Ehrhard argues 
the Lightning Bug only succeeded thanks to the opportunity provided by the Vietnam War, 
including covert funding. The Air Force and CIA conducted joint drone research and 
development under a classified organization called the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 
Lightning Bug production alone cost $1.1 billion, equivalent to $5.8 billion in 2010 when 
Ehrhard wrote his study. Maintenance and operational costs greatly increased this figure, making 
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Why not Drones. 
 Only the Lightning Bug managed to overcome these problems. Numerous other drones 
were developed during the Cold War but were unsuccessful. Arguably the most ill-conceived 
Cold War drone was the Lockheed D-21B, developed under the codename Tagboard. Test flights 
began in 1964 with operations lasting until the program was canceled in 1971. Tagboard was 
designed to conduct deep penetrating reconnaissance missions in hostile airspace.
117
 It could 
reach an altitude of 95,000 feet and fly at a top speed of Mach 4, over 2,500 miles per hour.
118
 
Tagboard’s primary target was the Chinese nuclear facility at Lop Nor, a remote salt lake in 
Northwestern China. Since Lightning Bug drones were not feasible for reconnaissance at Lop 
Nor, Tagboard’s importance grew as the Chinese conducted nuclear weapons tests during the 
mid to late 1960s.
119
 
 There were major conceptual flaws with the Tagboard drones. Initially, the drones would 
be “piggybacked” by an M-12 plane and launched before reaching dangerous airspace. The first 
few launches were successful. During a flight on July 30, 1966, the drone collided with the 
manned carrier; both aircrafts were destroyed and a crew member was killed. No more 
piggyback missions were attempted. The carrying plane became the larger, more capable, B-52, 
which could carry it like a bomb.
120
 These drones were also sacrificial. They would fly over the 
target, photograph it, and return to a recovery zone. At the recovery zone, the film, camera, 
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guiding system, and avionics would be ejected, but the drone itself would self-destruct.
121
 
Willfully wasting these highly complex drones was not cost-effective. 
   
Fig. 11. The Tagboard drone alone, carried by an M-12, and two carried by a B-52.
122
 
 An NRO document from March 20, 1970, detailed thirteen different Tagboard test 
flights; they oft experienced technical difficulties. On November 6, 1967, the drone failed to 
sustain its proper cruise flight; poor engine performance was suspected. On December 2, 1967, 
“Flight,” was “terminated prematurely after failure of the hydraulic system and subsequent loss 
of control.” Flight was “terminated prematurely” again on January 19, 1968. A flight on April 
30, 1968, had a successful launch and boost but “was unable to sustain cruise and lost altitude 
and speed due to low thrust from the engine.” The drone was destroyed. Only a few of the 
thirteen test flights succeeded.
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 On December 17, 1970, a Tagboard reconnaissance mission over South China failed. The 
drone successfully launched and flew its preprogrammed route. The “recovery package” with the 
film was ejected at the correct location and on time. Recovery failed when the package 
descended far too rapidly and crashed into the water. Searches followed, but the recovery 
package appeared to have broken and sunk.
124
 
 A February 26, 1971, teleconference between then Secretary of State William Rogers and 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger reveals the attitude of high level officials towards 
Tagboard. President Nixon wanted to conduct a reconnaissance operation over China with 
drones. Rogers had previously questioned the wisdom of using drones there, but subsequent 
events changed his mind. He still noted that there was concern whether they would even work. 
Kissinger remarked that “It was a flap both times.” With Rogers’ support, and opinion united, 
Kissinger resolved to take the drone operation to the President.
125
 
 The last two of four Tagboard missions directed at the Lop Nor facility were conducted 
in March 1971. They failed, just like the first two attempts. In the end, the drone provided no 
reconnaissance intelligence on the Chinese nuclear facility.
126
 Supposedly, Tagboard had a 
handful of other successful reconnaissance missions, but details remain classified. The program 
was canceled in 1971, the remaining drones put in storage.
127
 
 More than technical problems plagued Tagboard. A 1965 document, which amounts to a 
to-do list, includes part requisitions, development projections, and organizational goals. The 
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document reveals the divided attention among multiple aerial surveillance projects, as well as 
efforts placed on conserving resources. The needs of four different aerial reconnaissance projects 
are discussed including: Tagboard, Dragon Lady (the codename for U-2 spy planes), SR-71 
Blackbird, and Oxcart (the Lockheed A-12-- the proposed U-2 replacement). All were trying for 
high altitude reconnaissance, but Tagboard was the only drone mentioned. Great attention was 
put into trying to consolidate the needs of the different projects. Conservation efforts included 
identifying “which Oxcart sensors… can be used in the SR-71 program” and determining “the 
number of Y-J engines, if any, which the SR-71 program would want to acquire from the Oxcart 
program.” A shopping list of spare Oxcart parts was to be prepared to supply the SR-71 program, 
Tagboard, and Dragon Lady. These actions were prudent, but nonetheless reveal the concern 
over the cost of these programs and the need to conserve resources.
128
 
 According to Ehrhard, Tagboard began with a budget of $31 million and costs increased 
tenfold over the project’s history. He details numerous other Cold War drone projects including: 
Compass Rose, the Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance System (AARS), the Elevated target 
acquisition system (ELTAS), other Fire Bee variants, Condor, and more. They accomplished 
little, but revealed the same problems: technical limitations, expense, and competition from other 
aerial reconnaissance technologies. In 1974, the NRO dropped all of its drone projects in favor of 
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Rise of the Predator 
Other than the Lightning Bug, only one other significant drone emerged from the Cold 
War though it did not prove itself until the 1990s.
130131
In the late 1970s, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began the Teal Rain program focused on the “research, 
development, test and evaluation of experimental long endurance vehicles.”
132
 Aeronautical 
engineer Abe Karem led a development team in the creation of a UAV prototype. He based its 
design around the anatomy of an albatross, and named it after the bird. Karem criticized the 
designs of other drones for copying manned aircraft and thus not being as aeronautically efficient 
as possible. The albatross’ long wingspan was the primary inspiration, allowing more efficient 
and longer flights.
133
 Looking to nature for technical innovation continues today: the military is 
currently funding the study of dragonflies for possible drone applications.
134
 After a successful 
demonstration in which an Albatross prototype stayed in flight for fifty-six hours, Karem’s 
company, Leading Systems, received funding from DARPA. 
135
 The primary strategic advantage 
of Karem’s prototype was its long flight times, which enabled it to “loiter” over targets when 
conducting reconnaissance missions.
136
 The military’s choice to use the word loiter is interesting; 
it suggests the machines are up to no good. Karem and Leading Systems developed two more 
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 UAV Pilot Chad, Quoted in Rise of the Drones, dir. Peter Yost. 
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iterations, the Amber and Gnat 750, but financial problems led Karem to sell his designs to 
defense contractor General Atomics, which eventually developed the drone into the most 
significant yet, the Predator and Reaper.
137
 
   
        Fig. 12. Abe Karem and the Albatross prototype.
138
                   Fig. 13. The modern Predator drone.
139
   
 Though Karem conceived of the drone in the late 1970s, the Predator did not prove itself 
until the Bosnian conflict in the mid-nineties. By this time, UAV development was consolidated 
and managed by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP), part of the larger 
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office. DARO published a UAV annual report for fiscal year 
1996, including events from 1995. The report praised Predator’s accomplishments. UAV 
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operations in Bosnia were the year’s main “success story” and Predator had been the most active 
of the various UAVs discussed.
140
 
 In fiscal year 1996, Predator flew over 530 missions for over 2,500 flight hours; 159 of 
the missions and 1,169 of the hours were over Bosnia. The drone’s video streams sent the long-
sought “common picture of the battlefield” to receiving sites in-theater and in the US. The 
DARO report claimed that Predator use “helped determine the course of the Bosnian conflict.” 
Predator’s ability to loiter in the air and provide long term surveillance revealed Serbian weapons 
movement as well as confirming that there had been no effort at withdrawal. The DARO report 
says this Predator-provided intelligence was the key to convincing NATO commanders to 
resume the bombing campaign, which led to the Dayton peace accord in December 1995.
141
 
Congressional review of the Department of Defense’s drone use also mentions Predator 
contributions to maintaining the cease-fire in Bosnia including “detecting troop movements in 
unauthorized areas, discovering previously unknown weapons factories or depots, and locating 
units that were breaking the peace.”
142
 The military now had a drone with potential.  
 Predator’s successes went beyond Bosnia. In 1995 and 1996, it was the first UAV to 
utilize both SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) and advanced satellite links.
143
 Predators were also 
tested in naval exercises. A Predator demonstration involved a drone being controlled by a 
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submerged Submarine; the drone transmitted its video stream back to the underwater vessel. 
Another test included a Predator supporting a carrier battle group.
144
 
 Despite these accomplishments, Predator still faced the same obstacles as the drones that 
preceded it. Predator’s full, weaponized potential wasn’t revealed until 2001 when it first fired a 
Hellfire missile.
145
 In the 1990s, DARO’s UAV vision was limited; a report has their 
presumptive slogan “Supporting the Warfighter” on every page.
146
 Restricting UAV 
development solely to support roles made Predator secondary to other UAVs. In the same 1996 
DARO UAV report which praised Predator’s accomplishments in Bosnia and its various new 
feats, “program prioritization” was placed on other projects. “The number one priority for UAVs 
remains the tactical UAVs (Outrider and Pioneer).” Predator came second to the drones which 
provided immediate tactical aid to battlefield forces.
147
 This nonetheless demonstrates progress 
for drone adoption. Cold War drones had been outdone by manned reconnaissance planes and 
satellites. Finally, viable drone choices existed.  
 Predator also faced technical issues. Initially, the UAV had operational limitations based 
on weather. During missions the drone’s wings would ice up, though a remedy was quickly 
found. After the Bosnian missions, technical improvements were needed including “an all-
weather sensor” and the need for “all-weather flight capability.” The communication links also 
needed development, to enable conversations between drone pilots and air traffic control, as well 
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as better utilization of the video streams provided by Predators. These issues were overcome, 
though problems still remain.
148
 
 Predator adoption was not inevitable; it took over two decades for its potential to be 
recognized. Like the Lightning Bug, the Predator faced the same problems as other drones. 
These drones’ successes, however, were brought on because they proved their capabilities at 
opportune moments: Vietnam for the Lightning Bug, Bosnia and especially the War on Terror 
for the Predator. Besides greater adoption, the Predator’s demonstration of UAV potential had an 
even wider effect on American foreign policy and military analysis. 
Foreign Drone Proliferation 
 American recognition of UAV potential in the mid-1990s coincided with concern over 
international drone proliferation. Previously, foreign interest in drones had been recognized. 
America supplied Israel’s drone needs. In a July 27, 1970, conversation, during the Egyptian-
Israeli War of Attrition, then Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin complained to Kissinger about 
Egyptian and Soviet interception of Israeli Skyhawk planes. A reconnaissance drone shipment 
had just been delivered, for operations too dangerous for manned planes. The type of drones 
were not specified, but, based on the year, they were most likely Lightning Bugs.
149
  
 Chinese interest in drones was not welcome. In 1976, China wanted to purchase twenty 
Fire Bee drones, the base target drone from which the Lightning Bug was modified, from 
Teledyne-Ryan Aeronautical Company.
150
 Ryan Aeronautical had been sold to Teledyne in 
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 On July 12, 1976, the prospect of selling drones to China was debated in a State 
Department meeting with Secretary Kissinger, Under Secretary Philip C. Habib, and other 
advisors. The primary concern was that China would modify the simple Fire Bee target drone to 
something more advanced, as America had done. The conversation, however, shows the 
disparaging attitudes towards drones at the time: 
Kissinger: We have to draw the line somewhere, though drones don’t really  
 bother me. 
(East Asian expert) William H. Gleysteen Jr.: They’re a waste of money. 
Under Secretary Habib: It’s their money. 
 
Politics, not the fear of Chinese drone development, was the deciding factor. Kissinger wanted to 
delay until after the Republican National Convention. Habib noted Teledyne’s persistence, 
saying “they’ll be up on the Hill.” He had already received calls from the congressman who 
represented the factory’s district. Ultimately, Kissinger did not want to have Chinese pursuit of 




This early concern was minimal. If America, the superpower, could not create viable 
drones, there was little concern as to what other nations might make. The shift came in the 1990s 
once drones had actually proven themselves. In 1996, DARO noted the rapid international 
proliferation of drones over the previous decade. In 1986, there were eighteen nations with UAV 
programs. By 1991, thirty-three nations were working on drones; fifty nations had them by 1996. 
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DARO’s objective was for America to stay ahead and have domestic UAVs to set the world 
standard.
153
 It was recognized, however, that “Adversaries have UAVs.”
154
 
 Though not directly stated, one of these adversaries was China. In 1997 the Secretary of 
Defense submitted a report to Congress detailing China’s efforts to modernize its military. The 
report argued that “China’s long-term goal is to become one of the world’s great powers.” UAV 
development was one, among many, pieces of evidence used to show China’s progress. The 
report singled out specific drones, “particularly those with extended ranges or loitering times.” 
These were the capabilities which Predator had recently proven to be of value.
155
 The report was 
taken seriously. Congressman Floyd D. Spence, Chairman of the House National Security 
Committee, issued a press release equating the report to “the clearest official acknowledgment to 
date that China views the United States as the greatest obstacle to its ambition to become a great 
power and that China is developing the military capabilities needed to achieve its goal.”
156
 
Chinese drones were mentioned in the next year’s analysis as well. Drones with “potential strike 
capabilities” were the new threat.
157
 
Similarly, concern over foreign weaponized drones seems to have emerged once America 
had proven this capability. Predator drones were first made lethal during a February 2001 
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weapons test in which the drone fired a laser guided hellfire missile at a stationary target.
158
 
Former CIA operative Henry A. Crumpton suggests that this deadly turn was prompted by a 
significant missed opportunity. In the late 1990s unarmed Predators had spotted Osama Bin 
Laden during a surveillance mission but lacked the ordnance to execute him themselves. An 
attack from another source would have taken too long.
159
 
By the end of 2001, the American military focused on UAVs from other nations which 
had the same potential. In December 2001, the National Air Intelligence Center produced 
classified reports analyzing foreign drone development. One was a datasheet on general UAV 
developments; it noted that “Operational weaponized UAVs are starting to proliferate” and that 
“a few countries have attempted to convert manned aircraft to unmanned weapon delivery 
vehicles.” The majority of the report was spent detailing the capabilities of over one-hundred 
foreign drones. Most of the details were redacted.
160
 A second report dealt specifically with 
weaponized foreign drones which were considered “one of the most versatile weapon systems 
available to foreign battlefield commanders of today.” The report argued that “weaponized 
UAVs pose an immediate airborne threat because of development and production activities in 
high-interest countries.” America had developed lethal drones; now it worried about others.
161
 
Drones struggled to succeed during the Cold War. As with the Kettering Bug and 
Operation Aphrodite, when drone programs faced overwhelming problems, whether from 
                                                          
158
 "Factsheets : General Atomics Aeronautical Systems RQ-1 Predator," National Museum of the U.S. Air 
Force. 
159
 Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2012), 154-155. 
160
 United States of America, National Air Intelligence Center, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System 
Datasheets, Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2001), accessed February 11, 2014, Digital National Security 
Archive. 
161
 United States of America, National Air Intelligence Center, Foreign Weaponized Unmanned Aerial 




expense, technical limitations, or superior competing technology, they were recognized and 
misguided efforts were suspended. This should not be seen as a failure but as the military 



















AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE PHOENIX PROGRAM IN 
VIETNAM AND CONTEMPORARY DRONE POLICY 
The development of technologically-advanced UAVS has led to an expansion of their 
use, much of it controversial. The most contentious use of drones has been their integration into 
counterinsurgency efforts, serving as assassination tools against militants, often outside of 
official warzones, in places such as Yemen, Somalia, and, most frequently, Pakistan. Recent 
Drone policy has been much-criticized.  Just as UAVs are not new; the flawed policies which 
govern their contemporary use are not new either.   
The Vietnam War suggests an important parallel-- The Phoenix Program. This was a 
counterinsurgency initiative to neutralize an American enemy, the Viet-Cong-Infrastructure 
(VCI.)  The historical parallels between these two programs are numerous, both suggesting 
conceptual flaws. Phoenix’s relevance to contemporary counterinsurgency efforts with drones 
goes beyond historical parallels. David Kilcullen, a distinguished counterinsurgency advisor, 
criticizes America’s drone use in Pakistan, advocating traditional counterinsurgency as the 
solution.
162
 He feels the solution to the spread of militant Islam is a “Global Phoenix 
Program.”
163
 Kilcullen is not the only one who clings to the memory of Phoenix as a successful 
operation. Alfred McCoy discusses Phoenix’s influence on the CIA and high level officials such 
as Donald Rumsfeld during the War on Terror.
164
 Others in the military recognize the flaws in 
traditional counterinsurgency, viewing drones as the solution. The Strategic Studies Institute and 
U.S. Army War College published a study on drone effectiveness by political scientist James 
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Walsh. He advocates drones as the solution to the issues of counterinsurgency: avoiding 
American loss of life, improved intelligence gathering, and improved precision when using 
deadly force.
165
 In reality, an examination of Phoenix not only reveals it to be a poor program, 
but that contemporary drone use suffers from many of the same problems. Both lacked adequate 
military intelligence resulting in few strategically significant accomplishments. Such 
counterinsurgencies, waged amongst the populace, caused excessive civilian casualties. Local 
hearts and minds turned against American action. The covert nature of these programs also led to 
corruption. Media revelations produced local public outrage, further turning the populace against 
the overall military operation. These problems not only demonstrate misguided policy but 
suggest the difficulties in such programs. 
What is a successful counterinsurgency? Simply put, it is an attritional effort which 
grinds down the opposing insurgency, while enabling the local populace to execute its own 
security needs. The assumption is that the insurgency’s limited resources will bring the greater 
power success. Winning the hearts and minds of the populace is also an essential goal. The 
occupation and security force provided by the occupying power cannot last forever; the local 
population must be prepared, eventually, to protect and govern itself. There is a great deal of 
justified cynicism concerning America’s invasions, often likening them to neo-colonialism. In 
Vietnam, America ostensibly tried to stop the spread of communism by creating a puppet state. 
Recent American action in the Middle East is frequently dismissed as an effort to control oil. 
Were it possible to have a successful counterinsurgency it would be an inherently anti-colonial 
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effort, first expelling troublemakers, then preparing the locals to handle their own security.
166
 
American counterinsurgencies in Vietnam and the Middle East failed to accomplish these goals.  
As is common with the Vietnam War, the legacy of the Phoenix program is heavily 
debated, with competing interpretations on virtually every aspect. Phoenix was a 
counterinsurgency effort carried out by the CIA, American military, and South Vietnamese 
military which targeted the VCI, a group composed of civilians who provided political support to 
the military efforts of the Viet Cong. Phoenix began as a hodgepodge of American efforts, later 
organized into ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program) in 1967. Later that 
year ICEX was renamed Phoenix, or Phung Hoang in Vietnamese, with CIA and American 
military funding and oversight of the largely Vietnamese effort. It was one of many programs 
within the overall Pacification effort, to strengthen the South and weaken the North. 
Pacification’s support for the South ranged from economic and social reform to traditional 
military support against the Communist North.
167
  
The stated goal of the Phoenix program was to “eliminate” or “neutralize” the VCI. 
Eliminate was changed to neutralize, because of public outrage in America.
168
  Neutralization 
came about when a member of the VCI had been captured, rallied, or killed. The ideal situation 
for Phoenix operations was to capture someone in the VCI and convert them to supporting the 
American effort. Committed members of the VCI who would not cooperate were often coerced 
through torture to provide information. According to official Government of Vietnam (GVN) 
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numbers, Phoenix “neutralizations” resulted in 40,994 deaths.
169
  The differing interpretations of 
Phoenix largely stem from which aspect of the program is emphasized and how much is 
acknowledged. Phoenix defenders, such as Guenter Lewy, or its director, William Colby, 
emphasize the positives (intelligence-gathering efforts); critics such as Douglas Valentine and 
Alfred McCoy, emphasize deaths and torture. The flaws in counterinsurgency efforts that arose 
during Phoenix have been carefully documented.
170
 
 There are contemporary parallels. Recent drone policy has utilized combat UAVs in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen, but this study focuses on their use in Pakistan. North 
Waziristan, on the border with Afghanistan, has been the primary target for American drone 
strikes outside of official warzones. At the time of writing, The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism has counted 383 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2014. This dwarfs the 
some seventy confirmed drone strikes in Yemen, or up to 8 in Somalia.
171
 The Obama 
administration has been primarily responsible for America’s drone war, which peaked in 2010, 
when 122 drone strikes were launched in Pakistan.
172
 The primary goal of these drone operations 
has been the targeted killing of terrorists.  
 A comparison of Phoenix with contemporary drone use reveals the self-defeating 
problems of counterinsurgency. The obstacles can be divided into three broad categories: 
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inefficiency, civilian casualties, and corruption. These mistakes often feed into each other, 
weakening the overall effectiveness of the programs.  
1. Inefficiency: Inadequate Intelligence, Imprecision, and Low-Level Deaths 
Inefficiency plagued the Phoenix program and contemporary drone use. A lack of 
intelligence about the enemy contributed to imprecision, resulting in low-level or innocent 
people being harmed.  
A. Intelligence Inadequacy 
 The first major reason for inefficient drone policy has been a lack of military intelligence. 
This is ironic-- Abe Karem’s Predator prototypes were designed for surveillance and 
intelligence-gathering. While drones have provided valuable Intel, both in and out of combat, 
their lethal uses have often been misguided.  
America’s disinclination to commit troops to military efforts in Pakistan is the primary 
reason for the lack of intelligence. Our campaign to date has relied mostly on UAVs to target and 
kill insurgents. After years of unpopular war in Iraq and Afghanistan, political and military 
leaders have been wary to commit ground troops to a counterinsurgency effort in Pakistan. Nor 
would Pakistani officials have consented to an American occupation. Traditional 
counterinsurgency, however, calls for a ground deployment allowing troops to gain intelligence 
through local interaction.  
 The absence of a ground presence in Pakistan led to a heavy reliance on technology. 
Using National Security Agency documents leaked by Edward Snowden and the accounts of 
drone operators, Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald reported that the NSA has been heavily 
involved with drone strike targeting. One NSA project, code named “GILGAMESH,” uses a 
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device implanted on a Predator drone to geolocate the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card 
inside cell phones. The GILGAMESH program is primarily used by the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) to track and target insurgents for execution. A second NSA program called 
“SHENANIGANS” used a different instrument to collect data from wireless routers, computers, 
smart phones, or other electronic devices for the CIA.  As impressive-- or intimidating-- as this 




 According to a former JSOC drone operator, military incompetence and ingenuity from 
targeted insurgents frequently made the NSA’s intelligence-gathering devices ineffective.  Many 
drone strikes were based solely around the cell-phone’s SIM card, not the content of phone calls. 
Insurgents recognized America’s ability to manipulate technology against them, and devised 
practices to protect themselves from targeting. Numerous militants simply purchased multiple 
SIM cards, making their cell phone difficult to track. Insurgent leaders also distributed their old 
cell phones to others within their organization, friends, or family members, making the previous 
connection of a targeted militant and their SIM card inaccurate. This has led to drone strikes on 
civilians who possessed a cell phone which had previously been connected to a legitimate 
militant target. A former drone operator also said that during meetings, insurgents would put all 
of their SIM cards into a bag, mix them, and then take a new random one, defeating the NSA’s 
efforts to connect specific militants to traceable SIM cards.
174
 
Ultimately, this reliance on technology amounts to the targeting of cell phones, not 
people; inaccuracy is worsened by the lack of other intelligence sources. Supposed safeguards 
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were in place to maintain precision. Before carrying out a drone strike, the target is supposed to 
be identified by at least two intelligence sources. However, both sources often originated in NSA 
technology, not human intelligence. Another safety measure was that drone strikes had to be 
carried out within sixty days after being approved by the President. However, one former drone 
operator believes this restriction led military commanders to act rashly, approving drone strikes 
when civilians were present, fearing otherwise being unable to kill the targeted insurgents.
175
 
 This hands-off approach to intelligence-gathering resulted in inadequate information 
about the majority of those killed. The identities of major terrorist leaders executed by drones are 
obviously known because more effort is put into their assassination; their deaths bolster the 
success of the overall drone program. However, according to analysis of drone strikes from The 
New America Foundation, only two percent of the people killed in drone strikes have been high 
level targets.
176
 The majority of people killed in drone strikes are labeled “militants.” However, 
this label is misleading. The Obama administration classifies any adult male killed in Pakistan by 
a drone strike as a militant, unless posthumous intelligence clears his name. This approach to 
targeting suggests disinterest in accumulating intelligence before someone is targeted.  A former 
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 Former CIA director Leon Panetta championed his agency’s efforts with drones as “the 
most effective weapon” against terrorism. However, many within the administration consider 
drone operations in Pakistan to simply be the best of several unpalatable choices.
178
  
        
  Fig. 14. North Waziristan, Pakistan, where most drone strikes occur.
179
 
Traditional military thinking claims that a ground presence would resolve America’s 
intelligence issues in Pakistan. A 2009 US Army Combined Arms Center briefing by Col. Trey 
Turner and Major Jay Adair reveals how drones were supposed to be implemented into 
counterinsurgency efforts. The briefing reviewed operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2008.  
One of the main conclusions: “Optimal employment of UAVs demands a nuanced understanding 
of the environment gained only through interaction with the population on the ground.” 
Interaction with the Kandahar locals was a requirement for proper intelligence gathering. 
According to the briefing, the UAVs would primarily be used for “Targeting” and “Precision 
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collection” and to “Understand the Environment,” or “Find the enemy.” Adequate intelligence 
efforts would utilize both local population and drone technology. Destruction would come from 
ground forces, conducting “Fix and Finish” operations against insurgents. The briefing’s 




 The tactical briefing warns against the adoption of the one-sided approach developed in 
Pakistan. In its discussion of proper UAV implementation, it asserts “If all you have is a 
hammer, everything looks like a nail.” It asserted that proper intelligence and understanding is 
necessary, impossible without ground assistance. General Stanley McChrystal is quoted as 
saying “Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly, we 
can lose this fight.” In both lethal and non-lethal encounters, whether the force came from a 
drone or soldiers, the importance of further intelligence-gathering with ground troops engaging 




 A strategic research project written by then-Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo for the United 
States Army War College also emphasizes the necessity of a human presence in proper 
counterinsurgency.  Though Tovo’s paper is not discussing UAV use, his argument is similar to 
that presented in the UAV briefing and remains relevant. Tovo emphasizes the importance of 
local cooperation and participation. He essentially advocates the necessity of winning the hearts 
and minds of the local population. He says:  
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Focused operations require a level of cultural understanding and local area knowledge 
that only a native can achieve. Attempts to operate unilaterally, without such expertise, 
can result in indiscriminate use of force and firepower, lost opportunities and a 
disenchanted, anti-American civilian population. 
 
 The lack of an American presence in Pakistan, as UAVs rain laser guided missiles on the 
inhabitants, has resulted in just what Tovo cautions against.
182
  
 Arguably the most important and influential critic of America’s drone policy has been 
David Kilcullen. An expert on counterinsurgency, he served as Chief Strategist in the Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department in 2005 and 2006, senior counter-
insurgency advisor for General David Petraeus in 2007 and 2008, special advisor for counter-
insurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and, more recently, as an adjunct professor in 
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Kilcullen’s critiques of drones echo Tovo’s 
thoughts on counterinsurgency efforts, emphasizing the necessity of involving the populace. 
Kilcullen’s ideal counterinsurgency effort relies on local partnerships which would allow the 
Pakistani people to begin handling their own security needs and isolate extremists from the 
communities they inhabit. This directly contrasts America’s top-down efforts, distancing its 
soldiers by exclusively using lethal UAV force.
183
 
 Intimidation is at the heart of insurgency, extremists wielding power over those they 
terrorize. According to Kilcullen, the key to defeating insurgency is removing an insurgent’s 
power to intimidate, “something that strikes cannot do.” He insists a troop presence is required in 
proper counterinsurgency. He uses a burglar allusion: 
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Imagine, for example, that burglars move into a neighborhood. If the police were to start 
blowing up people’s houses from the air, would this convince homeowners to rise up 
against the burglars? Wouldn’t it be more likely to turn the whole population against the 
police? If their neighbors wanted to turn the burglars in, how would they do that, exactly? 
Yet this is the same basic logic underlying the drone war. 
 
With no American presence in Pakistan, the local population’s primary experience with those 
ostensibly trying to help them are missiles strikes. With no one present to provide aid or improve 
security, terrorized locals have no choice but to submit to militant rule. Anti-American sentiment 




 Military thinkers place faith in the ability of an American troop presence to improve 
intelligence collection and counterinsurgency efforts. Cooperation and involvement with the 
local population is much-valued. America’s failure to establish adequate intelligence networks is 
just one of many factors which make counterinsurgency so difficult. Phoenix’s efforts included a 
direct American presence and heavy Vietnamese involvement but still suffered the same 
problems. 
 On November 25, 1967, Directive 381-43 from the U.S. Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (MACV) laid out the proper intelligence gathering practices for ICEX, the program 
renamed Phoenix later in 1967. Substantial requirements were put in place to ensure only 
legitimate targets. Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) initially needed to report a suspect’s 
name, position, rank, and function. Once apprehended, the elimination method of the VCI 
suspect, whether killed, captured, or convinced to defect, also needed to be filed. ICEX members 
would conclude their intelligence reports by disclosing the current location and status of the 





individual, plus any valuable information obtained during the operation. These were the high 
ambitions at the outset of the program. Though killing VCI members was an acceptable form of 
elimination, those involved considered intelligence acquisition as the primary goal.
185
 
 Within three years intelligence-gathering was inadequate. Robert Komer, headed Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) which oversaw the Pacification 
effort, including Phoenix. He wrote an internal report entitled “The Phung Hoang Fiasco” which 
critiques the intelligence efforts of the Vietnamese branch of the Phoenix Program. Dossiers on 
VCI targets were described as “incredibly poor.” Most neutralization attempts lacked adequate 
information to justify the pursuit of a supposed VCI target. Fingerprinting, a relatively simple 
method to document the identity of possible insurgents, was rarely used. The report also noted 
inadequate information extracted in post-capture interrogations. Ultimately, this lack of 
information led to the same problem faced with contemporary drones: an indiscriminate effort 
based on inadequate information which harmed innocent people.
186
 
 One reason for this failure to conduct informed operations was an unwise quota system, 
an attempt to quantify results. Internal neutralization statistics from 1970 reveal that the calendar 
year was divided into four quarters, each with a neutralization goal (one region’s goal was 
1,050.)
187
 This quota system simply put pressure on Phoenix operatives to conduct a high 
number of operations, rather than encouraging well-informed and fruitful action. The quota 
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 America’s failure to win the hearts and minds of the populace also contributed to 
Phoenix’s poor intelligence-gathering. Because the population was not favorable to the American 
cause, few provided information. This meant Phoenix frequently relied on paid informants. The 
monetary reward for information encouraged informants to provide false reports simply to be 
paid.
189
 America also resorted to torture to force information out of captives.
190
 
 Phoenix’s failures show that American ground troops and local participation is not the 
cure-all for an ill-informed intelligence effort, or an inefficient program. In reality, it seems 
unlikely that enough information could ever be gathered to ensure that innocents are never 
harmed, raising questions of whether a counterinsurgency waged among a population is feasible. 
Phoenix and drones sought precision in their operations, but additional tactical mistakes reduced 
accuracy and effectiveness.  
B. Imprecision 
 The precision of UAVs is supposedly one of their greatest assets. President Obama 
defended his drone-strike-heavy approach to counterterrorism, saying “For the most part they 
have been precise, precision strikes against al-Qaeda and their affiliates…”
191
 Technically he is 
correct. The ability to launch a single laser guided missile into a target is certainly an 
improvement over other aerial strikes. However, technical limitations have plagued 
contemporary drone operations. 
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 The way drone strikes are carried out, with operators frequently located on the other side 
of the globe from the war-machine they control, makes the complex camera system extremely 
important. For Predator and Reaper drones, one operator is solely dedicated to navigating the 
UAV while another controls the optics and missile targeting. Unfortunately, the optics of 
Predator and Reaper drones have revealed a phenomenon called the “soda straw” effect. Seeking 
an accurate missile strike, the targeting operator must zoom in closely on the target. It is this 
close-up on a target and loss of peripheral vision which causes the soda straw effect, the analogy 
being that it is “like viewing a small amount of liquid through a soda straw, instead of the entire 
glass.”
192
 This reduction in vision damages the accuracy of drone strikes because of individuals 
walking into the blast radius after a missile has already been launched, resulting in unintended 
casualties. 
 Though these deaths are unintentional and caused by a technological limitation, America 
is hardly absolved of culpability. American military officials are aware of UAV limitations. 
When mistakes are made because of faulty technology, blame is assigned to the perpetrators. The 
high demand for drones under President Obama has led major policy makers to encourage rushed 
production contributing to these technological problems. One example came from former 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates who favored “75 percent solutions over a period of months” 
rather than waiting an extended period for a “gold-plated” solution. In 2009, Colonel Eric 
Mathewson, who directed the Air Force’s task force on drones, told The New York Times that 
“The context was to do just the absolute minimum needed to sustain the fight now, and accept 





the risks, while making fixes as you go along.” This further places the blame for technical 
limitations on the military leaders making decisions.
193
  
 The military had been working on a solution to the soda straw effect, though without 
much success. Starting in 2007, DARPA supported defense contractor BAE Systems’ 
development of the Autonomous Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance-Imaging System 
(ARGUS-IS.)
194
 The system’s name ARGUS references the mythological Greek figure with 100 
eyes.
195
 As the reference suggests, ARGUS was a 1.8 billion pixel camera system which could 
provide drone operators with 65 independent high-definition videos in real time.
196
 This would 
have allowed operators to have both zoomed-in and out video streams as they conducted a drone 
strike, thus maintaining peripheral vision of the blast area and hopefully eliminating the soda-
straw effect. 
197
 However, the ARGUS-IS has been removed from DARPA’s list of active 
projects and replaced with the ARGUS-IR, focused primarily around Infrared optics.
198
  
 In early 2013 when DARPA revealed the ARGUS-IS system to the public, it was still 
being tested and had not yet been incorporated into drone strike operations. Its removal from 
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DARPA’s active projects suggests the project’s goals have been abandoned or at least shifted. 
The soda-straw effect still limits UAV accuracy. 
 Another major issue with UAV precision is the practice referred to as “double taps,” 
where drones use multiple missiles to destroy targets.
199
 Double tap strikes often utilize multiple 
drones at a time. One example in Pakistan used five drones and led to four missiles launched at a 
single target.
200
 The discovery of this practice was actually revealed by an NYU student, Josh 
Begley, who has used his twitter account @dronestream to document “Every reported US drone 
strike” from 2002 to the present. 
201
 Begley’s efforts demonstrate the increasing difficulty of 
maintaining the secrecy of covert operations. Since the double tap practice was revealed, 
numerous media sources have investigated further, raising doubt about UAV accuracy. The need 
for multiple missile strikes already harms UAV’s precision image, but increased civilian 
casualties resulting from this practice has been the main concern. First responders, coming to aid 
after the initial missile strike, are caught in the blast radius of the subsequent strikes.  
 There has been at least one instance of friendly fire from a drone strike. On April 5, 2011, 
drone operators were trying to provide aid to ground troops in Afghanistan as they were attacked 
by insurgents. Muzzle flashes from the weapons of American troops were thought to be coming 
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 Phoenix also sought precision and failed. Optimism was high when ICEX, Phoenix’s 
forerunner, was first being organized. An ICEX briefing from August 10, 1967 held the hope that 
as the program developed “an ever increasing “rifle shot” approach rather than a shotgun 
approach” would be used to eliminate the VCI.
203
 The expected result of this selective use of 
force would remove enemies without harming the general populace. 
 In reality, Phoenix operations frequently resembled the blunderbuss rather than rifle. 
Phoenix’s quota system put pressure on operatives to produce numbers. This frequently resulted 
in cordon-and-sweep operations which affected innocent civilians. Innocent people would be 
detained as suspected VCI in jails and holding areas, often for weeks or months until they were 
processed or escaped. These practices ultimately served the VCI more than the American effort. 
The actual VCI in these jails could indoctrinate their previously neutral civilian cellmates to their 
ideology and enhance it with the American abuse they were suffering.
204
   
Very little was gained from these efforts. The imprecision of Phoenix is apparent in the 
scores of people it neutralized.  American statistics counted 81,740 supposed VCI 
neutralizations, 26,369 of whom were killed. The GVN said there had actually been 40,994 
deaths.
205
 By the end of 1969 the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam estimated that 75-
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90 percent of the supposed VCI captured were released or received short jail sentences. Guenther 
Lewy notes that the majority of suspects “were not neutralized for long, if at all.”
206
  
 C. Low-Level Deaths 
 A primary goal of American counterinsurgency has been to eliminate the insurgency’s 
leadership, a discriminatory application of force, aimed at egregious offenders. Conventional 
wisdom holds that an organization minus its leaders is no longer a threat. Contemporary drone 
policy and the Phoenix Program have championed this approach. However, the actual strategic 
progress gained from the death of insurgent leaders has been repeatedly challenged. Despite 
efforts at top-down damage to insurgency groups, the primary result of both programs has been a 
high, but insignificant, body count.  
 There are two metrics commonly used to analyze military operations, measures of 
performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs.)  MOPs are a tactical evaluation of 
how well an action was executed. MOEs are a more developed, strategic, analysis of an action’s 
effectiveness in achieving overall objectives. Ken Tovo argues that the Phoenix Program 
mistakenly conflated the two different metrics. Phoenix took an MOP-- the VCI neutralization 
totals--and considered them to be MOEs. The number of neutralized VCI demonstrated that 
Phoenix operatives were taking action against the enemy; however it did not analyze the 
significance of the neutralizations. Numbers alone did not analyze whether the overall goal of 
reducing the VCI’s control of the population had been advanced. In the end, Phoenix neutralized 
tens of thousands, but the control over the population, and the war, was lost.
207
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 The targeting of insurgent leaders is another instance of conflating MOPs with MOEs. 
Phoenix and drone policy view killing insurgent leaders as an accomplishment without analyzing 
how much the enemy has truly been hurt, or the strategic progress made from their deaths. Tovo 
argues that the death of insurgent leaders means little unless “issues such as replacements, 
criticality [sic] of losses, or minimum required personnel levels to direct operations” are 
considered. “Useful MOEs,” he notes “require a significant understanding of the enemy, the 
capability to collect detailed feedback on effects, and major analytical effort.” In other words, 
abundant intelligence is needed to know the effect of a counterinsurgency’s actions.
208
 
 David Kilcullen, discussing drones and the War on Terror, raises another issue resulting 
from specifically targeting insurgent leaders: personalizing the conflict. He argues that the effort, 
resources, and bounties devoted to locate terrorist leaders distracts from more important 
problems and turns the terrorist into a Robin Hood figure. He also notes the insignificance of an 
insurgent leader’s death. Kilcullen uses the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of Al 




 The pursuit of insurgent leaders characterizes Phoenix and modern drone policy. Phoenix 
always sought to neutralize high-level VCI members. When ICEX was first organized in 1967, 
the “rifle shot” precision was specifically directed towards the elimination of “important political 
leaders and activists in the VC infrastructure.” VCI members were divided into three classes: A 
for leaders; B for cadre members; and C for low-level supporters. Those in class A or B were 
supposed to be the main targets.
210
 Struggling with this goal, a new experiment was attempted. 
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On June 30, 1971, the Psyop Policy division of the Joint United States Public Affairs 
Office (JUSPAO) directed Phung Hoang to begin testing a high value rewards program in the 
Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, Bien Hoa, and Vinh Binh provinces. If successful the program was to 
be expanded. The goal was to “elicit information leading to the neutralization of specific high 
level VCI cadre by payment of large cash rewards.” In addition to weakening VCI leadership, a 
primary concern was what effect large rewards would have on the Vietnamese population. 
Control of the population was a major goal of Phoenix, and counterinsurgencies in general; 
JUSPAO assumed that in the struggle against communism, capitalism would help.
211
 
 Phoenix’s efforts actually affected insignificant members of the VCI. In January 1969, 
Richard M. Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote a report on the overall 
Pacification effort, including specifics about Phoenix. Helms endorsed Phoenix’s pursuit of the 
VCI, while noting its inefficiency. At this point, thirteen thousand members of the VCI were 
purportedly killed, captured, or convinced to defect. Helms noted that the total probably included 
“individuals improperly identified as members of the infrastructure; it certainly includes large 
numbers of low level cadres who can be replaced fairly easily. The numbers of key cadre 
eliminated is quite small, since they are the most difficult to find.”
212
 Poor intelligence hindered 
operations; legitimate targets went unpunished. Finding replacements for the affected 
insignificant members, already easy thanks to their simple roles, became even easier as anti-
American sentiment grew out of abuse.  
These problems remained constant. A Pentagon contract study on Phoenix operations 
from 1970 through 1971, coinciding with the extra emphasis from the bounty program, found 
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that ninety-seven percent of the Viet Cong targeted were of negligible importance. Fewer than 
half of the supposed VCI captured or killed by Phoenix were members of the Communist Party. 
Even Robert Komer, the founder of the Phoenix Program, concluded that it had been a “poorly 
managed and largely ineffective effort.”
213
 Non-combatants such as tax collectors and 
propagandists were targeted for neutralization.
214
 From 1968-1971 only twenty-one percent of 
those targeted for neutralization operated above the local level. All VCI were labeled “dangerous 
leaders of the insurgency,” leading to such abuses as an eighty-year-old woman arrested for part-
time commitment as a communist-liaison at the hamlet level.
215
 
For all of the deserved criticism Phoenix has received, it at least coincided with an overall 
Pacification effort which had redeeming qualities. American soldiers carried out civic action 
programs, taught classes to Vietnamese children, improved hygienic standards in rural villages, 
and more.
216
 In other words, a nominal attempt was made at winning the hearts and minds of the 
South Vietnamese. Phoenix also attempted, through flawed methods, to accomplish a grand 
strategic goal of neutralizing the VCI and winning over, or at least controlling, the local 
population. The same cannot be said for America’s counterinsurgency efforts with drones in 
Pakistan. 
Drone policymakers have adopted the same top-down plan which Phoenix attempted, 
once again with few results. The primary justification for drone use outside of official war zones, 
in places such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, has been the pursuit of Al-Qaeda and associated 
terrorist leaders. Though drones are criticized when mistakes are made, the successful 
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assassinations of terrorist leaders are touted to justify their overall use.  Terrorist assassination 
and civilian casualties are the two primary narratives for America’s drone use; individuals tend 
to emphasize one over the other, depending on their politics and sentiments. In reality, most who 
are killed in drone strikes are nameless “militants,” a term which, as mentioned, has been defined 
opaquely under the Obama administration. The death of these strategically insignificant 
individuals has proven counterproductive. 
 The New America Foundation (NAF), drawing on reputable media reports, has entered 
every American drone strike, 2004 to 2013, into a database. Their findings counter the Obama 
administration’s rhetorical emphasis on drones killing terrorist leaders. The total death count 
from drone strikes in Pakistan ranges from 2080 to 3428; only fifty-eight of those have been 
known militant leaders, roughly two percent of those killed.
217
 
 The death toll from drone strikes is a contentious issue. For Pakistan, the NAF counts up 
to 307 civilian deaths, and up to 334 of unknown affiliation. The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism counts up to 957 civilian deaths.
218
 Since the beginning of Pakistani drone strikes in 
2004, 2013 saw the lowest number of civilian casualties; however this reduction coincides with a 
drastic decrease in the overall number of strikes. This leaves the bulk of the deaths, up to 2787, 
labeled as “militants.” The NAF makes no mention of the controversy surrounding this term, 
suggesting at least some of those they counted as militants were simply male civilians.
219
 
 With no ground presence in Pakistan, there can be virtually no American effort to win the 
support of the local populace. Pakistan’s government has regularly protested after drone strikes. 
America’s action in Pakistan has lacked a tangible strategy, and it is unclear how the 
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accumulation of dead militants helps. An American counterinsurgency has yet again conflated 
MOPs for MOEs. Kilcullen sees no value in these operations--with no American presence there 
is no way for the Pakistanis who would resist militant control to do so.
220
 Labeling all Pakistani 
males “militants” also suggests the Obama administration cares little for gaining the support of 
the local population. Replacing low-level militants becomes easy when no good-will effort has 
been attempted. The counter-productivity resulting from collateral damage to civilians and 
property from drone strikes has been an oft-noted critique. It increases anti-American sentiment, 
fuels vengeful retribution, and turns previously neutral non-combatants into zealous insurgents.  
The Phoenix Program and America’s modern drone policy have both been unsuccessful 
efforts at counterinsurgency. America’s policies have wasted resources pursuing ill-defined 
goals, resulting in a large body count, insignificant from a military point of view. These 
attritional counterinsurgencies have sought to eliminate the enemy, but their policies made it 
easier for the enemy to replenish its forces. As frustrating as fruitless military action is, the most 
damning result of American attempts with counterinsurgency are the deaths of civilians caught in 
the crossfire.  
2. Civilian Casualties 
 Civilian casualties have always been a concern in war. However, the nature of an 
insurgency fought out among the populace brings an even greater risk to innocents. War’s 
inherent danger to civilian life directly contradicts a counterinsurgency’s attempts to protect and 
win over the local populace. 
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 Political Scientist Colm McKeogh, traces the concern for civilian protection throughout 
western civilization, culminating in the principle of non-combatant immunity which forbids 
specifically targeting non-combatants for attack.  
Hebrew, Greek, and Roman philosophers, poets and prophets decried violence against 
women, children and prisoners…. The Jewish scriptures taught that the innocent ought 
not to be punished for the crimes of the guilty…. Chivalric codes contributed the idea that 
one ought not to harm the unarmed and defenceless. Enlightenment rationalism deplored 
the waste and cruelty of war. And, finally, military professionalism focused on the skill 
of gaining victory over armed opponents without massacre and wanton destruction. 
 
Through the nineteenth century, every European power casually noted the rights of non-
combatants. Civilian protection was the first limitation placed on war in international law. 
Official recognition first came from the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 and was succeeded 
by the Nuremberg Trials and Geneva Conventions.
221
 
 Passed in 1977, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva conventions further laid out the 
protection of civilians during war. Most importantly, the nations in conflict were to “at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives.”
222
 The United States has signed but not officially ratified the addition. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross has insisted that, ratified or not, it is part of 
international law which binds the actions of every nation.
223
 
 This twentieth century formalization of the rights of civilians has coincided with a radical 
shift in the ways wars are waged. In The Command of the Air, Giulio Douhet, an early and 
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influential proponent for air power, emphasized the airplane’s ability to wage war against cities 
and populations. Targeting the enemy’s industrial complex and morale were central tenets of his 
argument, adopted during World War II by the United States, Britain, and Germany.
224
 
 Officially, American strategic bombing attempted to avoid civilian casualties during 
World War II, at least in the European theatre. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki and the even deadlier firebombing of Japanese cities such as Tokyo showed that 
America seemingly cared little about the lives and property of civilians. The February 1945 
firebombing of Dresden also suggests waning American interest in protecting German civilians. 
Far from a uniquely American problem, this shift in warfare is evident in many nations’ military 
doctrine, leading to a drastic increase in the number of civilian casualties. A 1999 study by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross concludes: “The fundamental shift in the character of 
war is illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, nine soldiers were killed for every civilian 




 The Phoenix program was and drone policy has been hazy as to the distinction between 
civilians and military. Douglas Valentine defines the Phoenix program as an assault on 
civilians.
226
 The VCI inhabited a grey area between civilian and military, aiding the North 
Vietnamese effort, primarily as non-combatants. For these non-combatant VCI, two of the three 
neutralization techniques, capture and defection, may have been appropriate, but the third, 
killing, was not. According to the South Vietnamese government, by the end of the program, 
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over forty-thousand of the neutralizations led to death. American kill counts were 26,369.
227
 The 
Obama administration’s overly-inclusive definition of militants also clouds the important 
distinction between civilian and soldier.  
These types of relationships are an inherent characteristic of an insurgency and suggest 
the difficulty of America’s protecting civilians while trying to win a war. Blame for civilian 
deaths is further complicated by the nature of insurgency, insurgents waging war behind the 
civilian populace. This issue is largely responsible for America’s embrace of collateral damage:  
“unintentional damage or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel 
occurring as a result of military actions directed against targeted enemy forces or facilities. Such 
damage can occur to friendly, neutral, and even enemy forces.”
228
 Some, like Guenther Lewy, 
endorse this rationalization, and blame the insurgents who purposefully endanger civilians in 
their method of waging war: “If guerillas live and operate among the people like fish in the 
water, then legally, the entire school of fish may become a legitimate military target.” Even if 
Collateral Damage is accepted as a justified military doctrine, the Phoenix program and modern 
drone policy have stretched its definition too far.
229
 
Lewy’s thinking seems to be on a slippery slope; many have critiqued collateral damage 
as utilitarian excuse. It essentially allows the American military to conduct any operation without 
concern for civilian casualties as long as there is an ostensible military target. Such moral 
absolutist philosophers as Thomas Nagel argue that the killing of non-combatants is never 
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justified and is morally equivalent to murder.
230
 In unjust wars, which may or may not include 
Vietnam and The War on Terror, Philosopher Jeff McMahan would place the guilt of any death, 
civilian or not, on the aggressor who began the conflict. Every individual involved with the 




Both positions go too far; in reality, enough evil is present in war for each side to be 
guilty. Every participant in an armed conflict is responsible for the discriminatory use of force 
and adherence to the principle of non-combatant immunity. If the war involves an insurgency, 
then both sides inevitably harm innocents. When the guilt for civilian deaths is being determined, 
it seems silly to blame a foot soldier reacting to a hostile situation, even if the larger effort is 
unjust. Though resulting civilian deaths from an American attack on a military target are 
abhorrent, they are generally unintentional. An insurgency’s use of civilian shields is 
premeditated. Yet, an insurgent effort, albeit unethical, may be strategically sound. The North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong had no hope of defeating America in a conventional war, but did so 
in an unconventional manner. The results of the War on Terror seem to be the same. The death of 
civilians is arguably the most important reason an insurgency succeeds. The opposing power’s 
invasion and occupation leads to death and abuse which lends legitimacy to the opposing 
insurgency. The validation of an insurgency allows it to be replenished and survive, making 
attrition impossible. In Vietnam and the Middle East, insurgencies have proven very effective at 
draining the will of America to wage war.  
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Much of Phoenix’s legacy has been sensationalized by antiwar sentiment, from the 1970s 
to the present. The secondary literature is divided as to what actually happened. Douglas 
Valentine’s The Phoenix Program is considered by Phoenix critics to be the definitive work on 
the subject though it has serious flaws.
232
 Moyar’s Phoenix and the Birds of Prey refutes 




 Phoenix was intended to target primarily civilians, or at least non-combatants. 
The VCI was mainly a political organization which supported the Viet Cong military effort. 
Officially, these non-combatants were supposed to be subjected to the police techniques of 
neutralization, captured and hopefully rallied but not killed.
234
 However, there were numerous 
instances where non-combatant VCI and unaffiliated civilians were abused or killed due to 
Phoenix.  
 The Phoenix program was subjected to numerous Congressional and Senate hearings in 
the early 1970s. These produced testimony revealing Phoenix’s poor leadership and 
indiscriminate operations. Congressional hearings in 1971 demonstrated that between 1968 and 
1971 Phoenix had killed 20,587 people identified as VCI. Each year’s death totals had outdone 
the last.
235
 In 1971 William Colby, who took over for Robert Komer in leading CORDS and the 
overall Pacification effort, including Phoenix, defended Phoenix’s idealized official policy, 
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emphasizing Phoenix’s intelligence-gathering efforts over assassination.
236
 He did admit some 
fault. When questioned by Congressman Ogden Reid, Colby said he was unsure that supposed 
VCI members could be distinguished from loyal South Vietnamese citizens.
237
 By 1973, in 
hearings for his nomination to become the Director of the CIA, Colby still defended Phoenix but 
was willing to recognize that “a large number of activities went on that are quite frankly, 
reprehensible.” Colby distanced himself and the program he led from criminal actions; others 
revealed the truth in their testimony.
238
 
In 1970, Komer’s report, “The Phung Hoang Fiasco,” noted the lack of evidence about 
the people killed and casts doubts as to their VCI affiliation.
239
 This issue, and its repercussions, 
was further revealed by Michael Uhl, part of a Military Intelligence Team connected to Phoenix, 
who testified to Congress in 1971. His duties included interrogation and torture in the pursuit of 
intelligence. Uhl rejected Colby’s testimony, insisting he had a “general lack of understanding of 
what is actually going on in the field.” Uhl said that it was impossible that the tens of thousands 
of VCI neutralizations tabulated could have been carried out according to the official policies 
Colby presented. He described indiscriminate dragnet operations which led to those who “looked 
good” being classified as VCI. When the captured Vietnamese were turned over to intelligence 
workers like Uhl, enormous pressure was placed on them to be identified as civil defendants 
(CDs) who had violated the law or been involved with the VCI. Uhl claimed that most of the 
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CDs he dealt with were women and children.
240
 As Uhl indicated, and McCoy has detailed in 
Torture and Impunity, torture was frequently used on those Phoenix captured. Using torture 
against military personnel violated international law; using it against non-combatants and 
innocent civilians damns Phoenix further.
241
 
 False imprisonment and torture was not the full extent of Phoenix’s abuses towards 
civilians. Numerous stories from those involved with Phoenix operations have described 
horrendous actions which occurred. Vincent Okamoto, a lieutenant with the 25
th
 infantry division 
in 1968, said that the typical pursuit of a suspect involved a “Phoenix team” (likely a PRU) going 
into a village and forcing villagers to identify suspected VCI. Okamoto said that the pursuit of 
VCI suspects he witnessed involved Phoenix operatives forcing a reticent informant into 
cooperation. Phoenix teams would “put a sandbag over his head, poke out two holes so he could 
see, put commo wire around his neck like a long leash, and walk him through the village” until 




 Stories like this led many to term Phoenix an “assassination program.” This label is 
troublesome because, as noted, Phoenix engaged in much more than simply killing VCI. 
However, assassinations or targeted killings did take place. In his 1971 Congressional testimony, 
Colby admits that limited wrongdoings occurred, but insisted they were carried out by 
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individuals who acted in violation of official Phoenix policies.
243
 Though these actions may have 
been outside the purview of Phoenix directives, testimony from others involved with Phoenix 
argued that the issues were widespread, known, and ignored.  David Sheridan Harrington was a 
program officer in CORDS and involved with Phoenix operations. During Colby’s nomination 
hearing in 1973, Harrington criticized him for his involvement with Phoenix and misleading the 
public. Harrington echoed Uhl’s testimony, saying “large gaps existed between Phoenix policy in 
Saigon and operations in the field.” Harrington insisted that Colby and other CORDS leaders 
knew about Phoenix abuses.
244
 
 Harrington describes attending a high-level briefing in DaNang, 1969. Colby, regional 
CIA director Harry Mustakos, and other military officials were there as well. According to 
Harington, Mustakos gave a defensive presentation on the CIA’s involvement with the PRUs, 
detailing the difficulties which led to more deaths than Colby and the CORDS command wanted. 
He complained that the PRUs, made up of Vietnamese, were frequently out of the control of their 
CIA handlers, killing too many people, and violating policy. Ultimately, Mustakos’ briefing 
made it clear that “many abuses occurred at the operational level of the Phoenix program, 
including widespread and uncontrolled assassinations.” Harington insisted that Colby’s previous 
testimony was misleading because he knew about these widespread issues. Not only was he 
aware of these problems, Harrington testified, but little was done to remedy them.
245
 
 A frequent excuse for military misdeeds is to downplay their frequency, noting only that 
they violate official policy. The same reasoning is present in Lewy’s America in Vietnam, which 
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attempts to assuage American guilt over Vietnam because misconduct was not officially 
condoned.
246
 This reasoning makes little sense and is another complication to counterinsurgency 
efforts which hinders their acceptance. Civilian abuse will never be an official policy but will 
always happen in war. The fact that Phoenix and counterinsurgencies operate covertly enables 
these abuses to be more effectively hidden, at least temporarily. When misconduct is finally 
revealed, the effect is widespread public dissatisfaction, condemnation, and suspicion, reducing 
support for the overall military operation and further hindering the possibility of a 
counterinsurgency to succeed.  
 Supporters of America’s modern drone use also like to downplay civilian casualties. In a 
speech on drone policy, President Obama piously declared: “before any strike is taken, there 
must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured.”
247
 While still a high-level 
counterterrorism adviser, current CIA director John Brennan attempted to downplay civilian 
casualties from drone strikes, saying “despite the extraordinary precautions we take—civilians 
have been accidently injured, or worse, killed in these strikes. It is exceedingly rare, but it has 
happened.”
248
 However, external investigation has proven the official record to be false. The 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism notes 416 to 957 civilian deaths in Pakistan. This may seem 
low in the grand scale of war. Another interpretation of the statistics would be that each of the 
383 supposedly precise strikes in Pakistan has averaged one to three civilian deaths.
249
 Living 
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Under Drones, a joint study by the law schools of Stanford and NYU, refutes the official record, 
documenting higher civilian casualties and immoral uses of drones.
250
 
 Double tap drone strikes have hindered precision, resulting in civilian casualties. After 
the initial missile strike, first responders come to the area in an attempt to provide aid and 
remove bodies from the wreckage. Islamic funeral tradition calls for burial rituals to be 
conducted as soon as possible, increasing the presence of civilians at blast zones. The subsequent 
missiles launched in double tap strikes frequently kill or injure those who have arrived on the 
scene. Unlike the initial strike which would have presumably been directed at a military target, 
the subsequent strikes mainly affect civilians. The fear of these subsequent strikes has also 
delayed locals and humanitarian workers from providing emergency medical care.
251
 
 Double taps seem to violate the definition of Collateral Damage, in which civilian 
casualties must be unintentional. Drone operators have live video streams of the targeted area. 
The arrival of first responders would be visible to operators, suggesting that operators are aware 
of the civilian presence before launching subsequent missiles.  
 These double tap strikes also bring American military action close to state terrorism. 
There is little difference between sanctioned drone double taps and terrorist actions, also referred 
to as double taps. A 2007 study by the Department of Homeland Security explained the double 
taps carried out by militant Islamist group Hamas, saying “a device is set off, and when police 
and other first responders arrive, a second, larger device is set off to inflict more casualties and 
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 The only significant difference between the Hamas double taps and the 
American double taps is that the terrorists lack drones to carry out their attacks. 
 The Obama administration’s redefinition of “militants” to include all adult males is an 
attempt to present drones as more precise while whitewashing the killing of noncombatant males 
in drone strikes. It also suggests poor strategy. Indiscriminately labeling an entire populace as the 
enemy is a strategic and moral blunder. It demonstrates a lack of concern for civilian casualties 
or winning the support of the Pakistani people. The military has explicitly attempted to suppress 
the tally of civilian deaths from drones. Brandon Bryant, a former drone operator turned vocal 
critic of America’s policies, reported his personal experience with the cover-up of civilian 
deaths. Bryant had a tragic experience with the soda-straw effect, the loss of peripheral vision 
due to the cameras being zoomed in. Responsible for the drone’s targeting system, Bryant 
accidentally killed an unseen child who entered the blast radius after the missile had been 
launched. When Bryant questioned “Was that a kid?” military superiors responded that “No. 
That was a dog.” Bryant reviewed the scene on video, confirming that the figure in question had 




 Those killed by America’s drone policies are not the only ones harmed. At present time, 
up to 1,639 Pakistanis have been injured as a result of drone strikes.
254
 Living Under Drones 
analyzed the psychological effects that drones have had on Pakistanis. The ever-present threat of 
a drone strike hitting their community has altered the behavior of those in the affected regions. 
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Group meetings, including efforts to resolve tribal disputes, are shunned because they draw the 
attention of drone operators.
255
 Up to 202 children have been killed by drones in Pakistan.
256
 
This has led to parents keeping their children from attending schools.
257
 This fear of drones also 
subdues the population without leaving negative physical evidence. Ultimately, Hap Arnold’s 
desire of using Weary Willy drones to psychologically damage the populace has been realized in 
the twenty-first century.
258
 However, his hope that this would help America win wars has been 
proven false.  
 In reality, the anger generated from American drone use has been detrimental to military 
goals. One of the main reasons Kilcullen has adamantly opposed drone operations in Pakistan is 
that outrage has spread beyond the affected regions and throughout the country.
259
 A Pew 
Research Center study supports this claim noting that drone use has caused a drastic reduction in 
the Pakistani population’s support for American help in fighting extremist groups. The study 
concluded that 74% of all Pakistanis consider America an enemy.
260
 The Pakistani government 
frequently protests American action within its borders. Pakistan’s ambassador to the United 
States, Sherry Rehman, has denounced drone strikes as counterproductive, advocating a different 
approach to fighting terrorism.
261
 Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in 
Times Square, suggested during his trial that he was seeking vengeance in response to drone use. 
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 There are additional cultural inspirations for this pursuit of revenge against drone abuses. 
The primary ethnic group of tribal North Waziristan, where most Pakistani drone strikes occur, is 
the Pashtun or Pakhtun people. They live under an ancient and unwritten code of ethics called 
Pashtunwali, translated as “the way of the Pashtuns” or “the code of life.”
265
 One of the nine 
principles of Pashtunwali is Badal, the right to seek revenge against a wrongdoer. This right 
verges on obligation, as the failure to exercise Badal results in the offended being stripped of his 
honor. The cultural significance of honor is conveyed by the great Pashtun poet Khushal Khan 
Khattak who wrote “Let the head be gone, wealth be gone, but the honour must not go, because 
the whole of dignity of a man is due to this honour.” The importance placed on revenge creates a 
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cyclical situation as most Badal results in responding Badal.
266
 Badal also has no time limit or 




 Seeking revenge for a wrongdoing, especially the death of a friend or family member, is 
far from uniquely Pashtun. However, its cultural formalization suggests it has a powerful 
influence. Every person killed by a drone strike creates more enemies for America, who are 
culturally obligated to seek revenge on America. The ill-will generated makes winning an 
attritional counterinsurgency implausible if not impossible. 
 The common excuse for civilian casualties resulting from counterinsurgencies has been 
advocacy for humanitarian intervention--more civilians would be killed if America did nothing. 
This thinking is a fundamental part of counterinsurgency efforts. In response to allegations of 
possible Geneva Convention violations, Colby insisted that Phoenix’s purpose was “to protect 
the Vietnamese people from an intolerable and systematic campaign of terrorism and subversion 
directed by the Viet Cong Infrastructure.”
268
 In a speech on drone policy, President Obama used 
similar justifications, saying “To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far 
more civilian casualties…. Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the 
death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties 
from drone strikes. So doing nothing is not an option.”
269
 While it is true that the local 
populations have suffered most from the Viet Cong and radical Islamic terrorists, this advocacy 
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of force not only dismisses the numerous issues already raised but ignores the context of terrorist 
actions.  
 Terrorist actions disproportionately affect local civilians; the motivation of this action is 
frequently to oppose the American occupation. The Vietcong carried out gruesome deeds against 
civilians, but did so for political reasons directed at those cooperating with the Americans. 
Stanley Karnow discusses the selective brutality of the Viet Cong, relating an incident where two 
South Vietnamese Policemen were dragged off a bus and publicly decapitated for their 
cooperation.
270
 One justification for using monetary rewards for the high value target program 
was that the Vietnamese who cooperated would be in grave danger.
271
 In CIA operative Frank 
Snepp’s memoir about the fall of Vietnam, he says he feared for the former VCI whom Phoenix 
had convinced to defect, as well as the Vietnamese Phung Hoang members.
272
 In the Middle 
East, it is unclear how continued American presence will ease tensions. Osama Bin Laden’s 
initial anti-American Jihad was in reaction to Saudi Arabia’s decisions after Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait. The Saudis preferred American military support, and declined Bin Laden’s offer of 
military assistance. He was also angry because American, non-Muslims would enter the Islamic 
holy sites, Mecca and Medina. In Iraq and Afghanistan, destabilization wrought by American 
action has led to sectarian violence. The stated goals of the Phoenix program and drone policy 
may seem noble, but it is disingenuous to ignore the context for insurgent actions and downplay 
the violence directly inflicted by American action.  
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 Clearly, American drone policy needs revision. However, counterinsurgencies are covert 
operations with details withheld out of tactical necessity. This has made public discourse and 
criticism of the programs more difficult than it should be. The fact that drone operators and 
commanders are isolated from the field of battle also makes assigning guilt more difficult. 
President Obama has acknowledged this, noting that covert drone operations “can end up 
shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also 
lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.”
273
 Ultimately, this 
lack of transparency under which Phoenix and drones operated leaves the responsibility of 
revealing American indiscretions to the media. The revelation of American misdeeds stimulates 
public outrage and more formal condemnation, turning the populace further against the war 
effort. 
3. Covert Corruption, the Media, and Public Outrage 
 Counterinsurgencies operate covertly out of tactical necessity. This lack of transparency 
with Phoenix and drones allowed misguided policies to go largely unchecked. Secrecy enabled 
corruption.  
The corruption which pervaded Phoenix is a testament to the appeal of capitalism in a 
war against communism. Phung Hoang agents falsely arrested and imprisoned civilians simply to 
extort bribes from their families.
274
 Agents were also receptive to bribes from the VCI itself, 
releasing legitimate VCI members.
275
 Informants gave false information simply to be paid.
276
 
These matters weakened the counterinsurgency effort.  
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 More than corruption occurred. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27, 
1973, bringing peace to Vietnam. However, declassified State Department documents reveal that 
Phoenix Operations were revived after only two months of inaction and in violation of the 
ceasefire. Major General Nguyen Vinh Nghi “directed all sectors to sharply increase intelligence 
operations and vigorously root out the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).” Previously, the GVN 
had attempted to maintain Phoenix through a semantic shift, pursuing “Disruptors of Domestic 
Tranquility,” rather than the VCI. General Nghi’s decree lifted this linguistic veil. Notably, 
Saigon insisted Phoenix be revived “without the fanfare and publicity that it used to receive,” 
proof that such actions violated the peace agreement.
277
  
 Former Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, revealed that the drone war in Pakistan 
was created under questionable means. America’s drone operations outside of official war zones 
were predicated on pursuing and executing top Al-Qaeda leadership, whose primary goal is to 
harm America. However, in order to pursue Al Qaeda in Pakistan, the CIA made a deal with 
Musharraf to begin drone strikes in his country. In 2004 the CIA not only agreed to kill Nek 
Muhammed but that Pakistani Intelligence would have a hand in drone strike targeting. 
Muhammed was a Pashtun tribal leader unaffiliated with Al-Qaeda who had rebelled against the 
Pakistani state. Muhammed flaunted his successes against the Pakistani army, dismissing 
Musharraf as an American lackey. The very first drone strike carried out in Pakistan killed 
Muhammed, and others in his compound, including two boys ages ten and sixteen. America’s 
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drone war in Pakistan thus began with an imprecise strike which killed civilians and was not 
directed against anti-American Al Qaeda.
278
 
 Despite the covert nature of these programs, details emerged from the media, typically 
revealing numerous misdeeds. The revelation of such things led to public outrage. With little to 
no information from the government about these programs, the media accounts are accepted as 
fact. The end result of this negative media exposure is a loss of confidence in the American 
government and distrust in the overall military engagement. 
 Moyar exerts a great deal of effort in Phoenix and the Birds of Prey to counter false 
claims against the Phoenix program. Most of these claims emerged in the anti-war early 1970s, 
when Phoenix was exposed. Misinformation about Phoenix’s misdeeds matters because of 
Phoenix’s covert nature and the existence of numerous abuses. Disillusioned with the Vietnam 
War, the public accepted anything negative. Media revelations and public outrage towards 
Phoenix helped bring on Congressional and Senate hearings. Phoenix was titillating enough a 
subject for a Penthouse article, “The Phoenix Murders” in the December 1975 issue.
279
 
 Despite the mistreatment of the Vietnamese, in Phoenix and the larger war effort, the 
American anti-war movement was primarily driven by anger at American deaths.
280
 Since the 
early days of UAVs, avoiding the loss of American life has been the main appeal of their use. 
Until recently, the relative safety drones provided Americans helped spur their popularity. In 
February 2012, a Washington Post and ABC News poll found that eighty-three percent of 
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Americans approved the use of drones against terrorists overseas.
281
 Opinion is shifting. Just a 
year later, March 2013, a Gallup poll reveals that overall support for drone use outside of the US 
dropped to sixty-five percent.
282
 
 The second poll was conducted shortly after Kentucky Senator Rand Paul carried out a 
thirteen hour filibuster on drone policy. Paul’s main goal was to illicit a guarantee from President 
Obama that drone strikes would not be used to target Americans on domestic soil.
283
 The issue 
was raised largely because at least four American citizens have been killed by drone strikes. The 
most significant shift in the poll results concerned whether Americans should be targeted for 
drone strikes in other countries. In 2012, seventy-nine percent of those who supported drone use 
endorsed targeting Americans in other countries.
284




A letter from Attorney General Eric Holder admits the four deaths, noting that only one 
of the four Americans, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, was specifically targeted.
286
 This is both comforting 
and disturbing. The Obama administration’s execution of Anwar Al-Aulaqi inhabits a legal grey 
area because it denied him his right to due process. As an active Al-Qaeda leader, his targeting is 
understandable if not justified. However, the death of the other three Americans demonstrates the 
imprecision of drone strikes. One of the others was sixteen year old Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi, 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s son. The strike which killed Abdulrahman was supposed to target Egyptian 
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Al-Qaeda operative Ibrahim al-Banna at a restaurant in Shabwa, Yemen. The intelligence was 
mistaken, and al-Banna was not there. Instead, a dozen men were killed, including Abdulrahman, 
who had no connection to terrorism. Thus, intelligence issues caused imprecision and civilian 
death.
287




Popular support for America’s drone counterinsurgency has dropped drastically, but a 
sixty-five percent approval rating is still a significant majority.
289
 Military thinkers, such as 
David Kilcullen, critique America’s drone policy in Pakistan, but advocate a traditional 
counterinsurgency: “Stabilizing Pakistan will require a focus on securing areas, principally in 
Punjab and Sindh, that are still under government control, while building up police and civil 
authorities and refocusing aid on economic development, security and governance.”
290
 Vietnam 
and Phoenix have taught us this does not work. 
 Covert counterinsurgencies deny the populace of a Democratic society its right to check 
the actions of those in power. Misdeeds inevitably occur in war, but attempts to evade guilt did 
not succeed for those involved in Phoenix or in charge of drone policy. Media revelations 
concerning Phoenix abuses spurred public outrage, resulting in Congressional and Senate 
hearings. President Obama did not officially acknowledge America’s drone program until May 
2013, long after media revelations, NGOs, and victims had spoken out about wrongdoings. The 
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secrecy governments adopt when engaged in questionable covert-operations breeds distrust and 
anti-war sentiment. 
Counterinsurgencies waged against amorphous ideologies, whether Communism or 
Terrorism, have proven to be misguided. These ideological wars happened because America felt 
threatened; in order for an ideology to be threatening, it needs followers. The devotion of these 
followers certainly varies in intensity, increasing after the devastation caused by American 
military action. In addition to being misguided, America’s counterinsurgencies have proven to be 
inefficient and self-defeating. They run counter to American Strategic Culture which prefers 
short, limited, and decisive conflicts. They seek to eradicate a group, but end up replenishing it. 
They try to protect innocent life but frequently end it. They win few hearts and minds, all while 













THE BIRTH OF A DRONE WORLD 
 It has taken nearly a century for America to become a drone nation. A major finding of 
this thesis is that drones are not new, and that one must learn from their overlooked past. The 
recent growth of drones in significance is undeniable. Other nations recognize this and are 
progressing quickly. 
 America pays close attention to foreign drone development. Though American drones 
have seen the most significant deployment, other nations are not far behind. The Italian Air 
Force already uses Predator drones.
291
 Another American drone, Northup Grumman’s Global 
Hawk, was redubbed the Euro Hawk and sold to Germany.
292
 Politics and expense, however, 
ended this particular foreign drone pursuit.
293
 Israel has already engaged in its own deadly drone 
strikes.
294
 In 2009, Russia reportedly spent fifty million dollars on Israeli drones to reverse 
engineer and improve their existing fleet.
295
 Iran has recovered American drones which crashed 
while likely monitoring Iranian nuclear development. Though embarrassing, most doubt Iran’s 
ability to reverse engineer the technology.
296
 According to Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah, Iran did provide the components to a surveillance drone which the politico-militant 
organization deployed over Israel in 2012, before it was shot down. The leader of Israel’s Air 
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Force, Major-General Shachar Shohat, warned that the nation would have to defend against 
Hezbollah and Hamas’ weaponized drones soon.
297
 
All of these efforts pale in comparison to China’s pursuit of UAV technology. Chinese 
drone development is nothing new, though efforts have certainly increased in recent years. 
American defense contractors that develop drones are a primary target of China’s ongoing 
cyberwar.
298
 The US Justice Department indicted five members of the Chinese military in its 
first-ever hacking charges against a foreign country. Though the charges relate to trade, not 
military secrets, they set a precedent for future indictments.
299
 
Xu Guangyu, a retired Major General who directs China’s Arms Control and 
Disarmament Association, told a New York Times reporter that China would increase its drone 
use. He coyly noted that America’s drones were technologically superior, saying “We can only 
envy their technology. Right now, we’re learning from them.” China, however, has clearly 
progressed.
300
 Chinese manufacturers are offering cheap knockoffs to other nations.
301
 A copy of 
the Predator drone called the Wing Loong (Pterodactyl) exists and has reportedly been exported 
to other nation’s arsenals.
302
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Fig. 16. China’s Wing Loong drone modeled on the American Predator drone.
303
 
 China’s drone deployment is telling. China seeks drones capable of fighting in contested 
maritime space. Drones were deployed during territorial disputes with Japan. Most American 
drones, like the Predator, are designed to operate in unopposed air space.
304
 Liu Yuejin, director 
of China’s Ministry of Public Security’s antidrug bureau, revealed plans to execute a murderous 
drug lord with armed drones; he was captured instead.
305
 The thought of using lethal drones 
domestically has already alarmed some Americans. The surveillance capabilities of drones are 
also of great interest to the Chinese police state.  
America’s drone use has damaged its moral standing. Writing about America’s use of 
torture, Alfred W. McCoy notes the negative impact of American wrongdoing, saying “The state, 
in all its majesty, must uphold the law and the highest standards of the human community. The 
state, particularly one that aspires to world leadership, is not only an enforcer; it is an 
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 When the world’s only superpower ignores or selectively chooses when and where 
to follow international law and abide by human rights, it weakens the world’s ability to regulate 
the abusive actions of other nations.  
 America’s drone policy has led to formal international condemnation.  China, frequently 
criticized for its human rights violations, has used America’s questionable actions in rebuttal. A 
report, issued by the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, points 
specifically to the civilian casualties caused by drone strikes.
307
 The United Nations Human 
Rights Council investigated the civilian casualties caused by American drone strikes, calling for 
independent investigations, oversight, and transparency.
308
 
The apparent solution to these problems is binding international guidelines and 
regulation. In the past, the rise of unregulated, revolutionary war technology drastically changed 
history. During World War I, Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare ruined President 
Woodrow Wilson’s hopes for neutrality, and led America into the conflict. Nuclear weapons 
brought an end to World War II in the Pacific, but also ushered in a decades-long arms race 
which threatened world destruction. Surely, the replacement of man with machines is as 
revolutionary a change to war as has ever been seen. The fear of fully-autonomous lethal drones, 
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Binding international regulation of drones is unlikely. Examining the history of drones 
reveals a repeated warping of the American experience in War. Drone use has been secretive, 
costly, immoral, inefficient, and counter-productive. In the past, the problems drones faced were 
recognized, resulting in suspension. The Kettering Bug was halted because of cost and 
inaccuracy. Operation Aphrodite’s drones also had accuracy problems, harming civilians in a 
manner contrary to America’s strategic bombing doctrine. The problems were recognized; the 
program was stopped. Drones rarely succeeded during the Cold War. The sole exception, the 
Lightning Bug, proved unworthy of support once the Vietnam War ended and covert funding 
dried up. Contemporary drones have seen the most significant use and have caused the most 
significant problems. Their covert use breeds distrust. It allows those in power to sidestep 
Congressional approval for war. Contemporary policy has focused primarily on terrorist 
assassination. Drone advocates downplay problems such as inadequate intelligence, inaccuracy, 
and civilian casualties. Predator and Reaper drones not only produce dead terrorists but anger, 
resulting in greater extremist recruitment. The fault lies not with drones, which are simply tools, 
but with misguided policy. The past suggests a solution: recognition of limitations and 
suspension of misguided policy. 
 The reliance on drones to fight wars reveals what drone critics term the “schizophrenic 
ease of remote killing.”
310
 The relative ease of drone warfare, lacking troop deployment, 
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avoiding American casualties, and costing mere money, makes waging war too easy. Without a 
meaningful deterrent to war, America may prove too willing to destroy. Drone operators, 
however, whose job is compared to playing video games, insist they recognize the reality of what 
they are doing.
311
 UAV pilots have developed mental illnesses like Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder.
312
  While drones remove troops from combat, killing people, even from across the 
world, still takes a toll. Though the mental anguish of those pulling the trigger is genuine, the 
suffering of the people receiving missile strikes is more significant. In a speech on drone policy, 
President Obama has acknowledged that using UAVs is “shielding our government from the 
public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a President and his team to view 
drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.”
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 As individuals are replaced by remotely-controlled 
war machines, accountability fades. 
For nearly one hundred years, drones have offered the prospect of removing soldiers from 
combat. Whether this is all for the good is questionable. Drones present a paradox. They save 
soldiers’ lives. If American lives were being lost, however, flawed American action would face 
greater criticism. Our counterinsurgency in Pakistan would not be happening were drones not 
replacing troops. Neither Pakistan nor the American populace would allow a ground invasion. 
America’s problematic drone policy allows for: war minus the necessary prerequisites (public 
debate, Congressional approval, adherence to international law) or requisite consequences. A 
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final aspect of the paradox is that it reduces the number of people who are well equipped to 























The Henry Harley Arnold Papers, 1903-1989, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
 
The Henry Harley Arnold Papers are primarily contained within 269 reels of microfilm and 
include Arnold’s correspondence, war journals, speeches, reports, orders, and other material. 
There is also a set of military mail logs on cardstock. The bulk of the material originates from his 
time as commanding general of the United States Army Air Corps (1938-1946) and as a member 
of the Joint Combined Chiefs of Staff (1941-1945). There are numerous documents concerning 
his role with early drones. These include his correspondence with Brigadier General Grandison 
Gardner, Charles Kettering, and General Carl Spaatz as well as reports on the progress of the 
Kettering Bug and Operation Aphrodite. These papers are located in the Library of Congress’ 
Manuscript Reading Room in the Madison Building. I was able to travel to Washington D.C. 
having received a research grant from LSU’s Department of History. Researchers should be 
aware of a fairly confusing military decimal system with which the microfilm reels are 
catalogued. The staff can provide a book which explains this system. 
 
The Douglas Valentine Vietnam Collection, The National Security Archive, George Washington 
 University, Washington D.C. 
 
This is an unpublished collection of documents which author Douglas Valentine used to write his 
book The Phoenix Program. It includes declassified documents from the CIA, State Department, 
CORDS, and individuals involved with Phoenix. The collection is located in the National 
Security Archive on the George Washington University campus. This collection is stored off site 
so researchers need to make a request with the Research Coordinator Dr. Marry Curry as well as 
schedule time in the reading room. I visited the National Security Archive and the Library of 
Congress on the same research trip, funded by LSU’s History Department. I was unimpressed 
with Valentine’s book but grateful for his efforts at compiling relevant documents. Researchers 
should be aware of an abundance of irrelevant material relating to Valentine’s Freedom of 
Information Act requests as well as court documents from his lawsuits to obtain documents from 
the CIA. Valentine also donated his interviews stored on cassette tapes. 
 
The Digital National Security Archive.  
 
This is the digitized database of many of the National Security Archive’s documents. The 
database boasts the most comprehensive collection of declassified government documents 
available with forty-two collections and 103,000 indexed documents. At my request, Hill 
Memorial library’s Assistant Curator of books Michael Taylor obtained a trial subscription to the 
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